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INTRODUCTION
By all indications, communications surveillance' is an increasingly
important weapon in government efforts to detect and thwart criminal and
terrorist activities. Between 2000 and 2009, government surveillance
applications under the principal statute regulating surveillance in criminal
investigations, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 ("Title III" or the "Wiretap Act"),2 nearly doubled.' Applications
under the statute regulating surveillance in foreign intelligence
1. I use the term "communications surveillance" rather than the more common term
"electronic surveillance" to capture technically different but functionally similar techniques for
acquiring the content of communications and related information. The term "electronic
surveillance" typically refers to the use of an electronic or mechanical device to acquire in real-
time wire, oral, or electronic communications and related source and destination information.
The prevalence of stored communications makes it possible for officials to retrieve
communications without using any device at all, but rather by compelling production of
communications and related transactional information from the third party with whom the
communications are stored. I use the term "communications surveillance" to capture this
practice as well as the more traditional device-based techniques. The term thus sweeps in some
activities that others refer to as "transaction surveillance." See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin,
Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 Miss. L.J. 139, 140 (2005); Christopher
Slobogin, Technology-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association's
Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 383, 387-88 (1997).
2. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82
Stat. 211, 214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
3. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COuRTS, 2009 WIRETAP REPORT tbl. 7,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2009/Table7.pdf.
DESIGNING SURVEILLANCE LAW
investigations, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"),4
doubled between 2000 and 2008 before dropping in 2009 to a level 36%
above the 2000 totals.5 The available statistics, moreover, dramatically
undercount surveillance activities, for they do not include data on
communications surveillance activities conducted under statutes requiring
no reporting6 or activities undertaken without judicial authorization.'
Against this backdrop, questions of how to reconcile privacy and law
enforcement interests-and, more specifically, what limits the law should
impose on executive discretion-take on paramount importance. These
questions have institutional as well as substantive dimensions. That is, the
issue is not simply what the limits on communications surveillance should
be, but who should set them-courts through application of the Fourth
Amendment or legislatures through statutes and the oversight process?
For most scholars, the question of who should regulate communications
surveillance activities has a straightforward answer: the task is one for the
courts applying the Constitution. Because constitutionally-based regulation
of communications surveillance tactics has been relatively limited since the
seminal case of Katz v. United States' in 1967, such scholars view the
surveillance law landscape as one reflecting judicial abdication: courts have
largely failed at reining in executive discretion and must play a more active
role.9 For a handful of other scholars, in contrast, the limited
4. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783,
1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-85c (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
5. Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to L. Ralph
Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of United States Courts (Apr. 27, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr/readingroom/2000fisa-ltr.pdf; Letter from Ronald Weich, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to James C. Duff, Director, Administrative Office of United States Courts
(Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/readingroom/2009fisa-ltr.pdf.
Until the report on calendar year 2009, the Department of Justice did not differentiate between
applications for electronic surveillance orders and applications for physical search orders. The
figure in the text assumes that the relative proportions of physical search and electronic
surveillance orders remained roughly the same between 2000 and 2009.
6. Examples include the collection of stored e-mail under the Stored Communications
Act, see infra notes 26-29, and the collection of information on the location of a suspect's cell
phone, see infra notes 37-40.
7. The National Security Agency's "terrorist surveillance program" between 2001 and
2007 offers one example. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN.
TECH. L. REV 3, 9 (2007); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of
the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9 (2004) [hereinafter Freiwald, Online Surveillance]; Aya
Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made Of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 781 (2008); Susan Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67 (2006); Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and
Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MIss. L.J.
43:0293] 295
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
constitutionally-based regulation of surveillance tactics is not a cause for
concern. Such scholars, notably Professor Orin Kerr, have argued for
legislative supremacy in surveillance law on the ground that courts lack the
expertise to evaluate rapidly evolving technologies." Even a majority of the
Supreme Court recently professed (or, some might say, feigned) a concern
about its ability to tackle questions about the privacy of modem
communications technologies."
Explicitly or implicitly, discussions about the relative roles of courts and
the legislature in policing surveillance tactics rest on premises about the
comparative competence of those institutions to limit executive discretion.
On one view, courts are more likely to set the right rules than legislatures
are, and courts must treat executive and legislative choices far more
skeptically if they are to fulfill the role that the Constitution assigns to
them.12 On another view, courts should take a hands-off approach to Fourth
Amendment questions involving new surveillance techniques, thereby
leaving space for congressional regulation."
These inquiries into institutional competence add an important
perspective to the study of communications surveillance law. They prompt
us to evaluate how well courts and Congress have protected evolving
communications technologies in the past, and to ask how we can expect
these institutions to handle such issues in the future. This Essay seeks to
deepen the institutional perspective in two ways. The first is to clarify the
roles that courts and Congress have played in regulating communications
surveillance techniques. For judicial abdication scholars and legislative
supremacy scholars alike, the role that courts have (or have not) played in
generating communications surveillance rules provides a jumping-off point
for normative claims about courts' competence to generate such rules in the
future.
51 (2002); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment
to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth
Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1551 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing
Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1296 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004); see also Jonathan F. Mitchell,
Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in National-Security Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1059 (2009);
Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An
Economic Approach, 97 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 505-06, 512, 528-29 (2007).
11. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629-30 (2010). But see id. at 2635 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing majority's position as
"unnecessary" and "self-defeating").
12. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 9, at 118-32; Simmons, supra note 9, at 1357; Slobogin,
Transaction Surveillance by the Government, supra note 1, at 167-82, 189.
13. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 857-87.
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The second goal is to bring questions of institutional design in
surveillance law to the forefront of the analysis. Discussions of the
comparative competence of courts and Congress to make surveillance law
rules tend to ask whether courts or legislatures should set the constraints on
executive discretion, without taking account of the institutional context for
implementing these constraints. Here, it is useful to distinguish between
what we might call "first-order" policy preferences for our surveillance
system-questions about what kinds of communications investigators can
gather, for what purpose, and during what time frame-from what we might
call the "second-order" design choices for implementing or enforcing those
preferences. To take one example, assume a preference that surveillance of
communications in a criminal case should involve only the collection of
communications concerning criminal activity. Apart from the question
whether it should be up to a court or Congress to set this rule, there remain
questions about who should enforce it and through what mechanisms: The
executive, through its own self-restraint? Courts, through suppression
motions? Courts, through civil actions against those who violate the rule?
Congress, through a system of oversight? Or a combination of these
decision-makers and mechanisms?
In other words, it is not enough simply to ask which decision-maker is
best suited to arrive at the first-order policy preferences. Without a
framework for considering second-order design choices available to
implement those preferences, we run the risk that our surveillance law
regime will not match first-order policy preferences-or, worse, that the
surveillance law regime will itself constrain the courts or Congress from
evaluating and adjusting the rules the regime reflects. This Essay thus seeks
to bring second-order design questions to the forefront of the surveillance
law debate and to provide a framework for considering these questions.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I explores the relative roles that
courts and Congress have played in generating communications
surveillance rules. After defining the relevant landscape, this Part identifies
certain institutional patterns that give rise to surveillance law challenges and
analyzes judicial decisions in light of those patterns. Part II turns to second-
order design questions. It begins by exploring the institutional competence
arguments and showing how viewing judicial or legislative decisions in
isolation rather than in sequence can oversimplify those arguments by
failing to account for how design choices affect the ability of legislatures
and courts to evaluate and adjust surveillance law rules. It then attempts to
disentangle second-order design choices from first-order policy preferences
and to show how the Constitution does and does not constrain those
choices.
43:0293] 297
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Part III identifies three types of design features that are likely to affect
institutional decision-making: (1) features that alter the participants' stake
in institutional processes; (2) features that generate and limit information
available to decision-makers and others; and (3) features that affect
institutional barriers to (and other constraints on) participation in
institutional processes. It then explores how attention to these features
might help to close the gap between the communications surveillance
regime that exists and a regime that would match first-order preferences
(however generated).
I. INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS IN COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE LAW
Scholars who disagree about the proper roles of courts and Congress in
checking executive discretion nevertheless agree about one descriptive
point: there is surprisingly little judicial constitutionally-based regulation of
surveillance tactics. The area is dominated by statutes, and with a few very
recent exceptions, most of the statutes have not been subject to serious
constitutional challenge in the post-Katz era.14 Although scholars agree that
judicial intervention is lacking, they draw different conclusions from its
absence. For judicial abdication scholars, the lack of constitutionally-based
regulation signals a need for more aggressive judicial intervention. For
legislative supremacy scholars, it signals that courts are, as they should,
deferring to superior legislative expertise.
Because descriptive claims about past judicial regulation of
communications surveillance fuel normative claims about how courts
should behave, I explore the descriptive claims here. I first identify the
universe of relevant statutes and key cases. I then introduce certain
institutional patterns in which constitutional questions about the use of
surveillance tactics arise. These patterns, I argue, permit a more nuanced
14. Exceptions include the Sixth Circuit panel opinion in Warshak v. United States, 490
F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), which was vacated by the Sixth Circuit siting en banc, 532 F.3d 521
(6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); the recent Sixth Circuit panel opinion in the criminal phase of the
Warshak case, United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010); the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), which was
ultimately reversed in relevant part by the Supreme Court, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619, 2629-30 (2010); and a handful of recent opinions involving the use of technology to track
a target's location, see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010); In re
Application of the United States, 2010 WL 4286365 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010) (Smith, Mag. J.);
In re Application of the United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010)
(Orenstein, Mag. J.). A district court judge apparently reversed Judge Orenstein's August 2010
opinion, but Judge Orenstein ruled the same way in a more recent case. See In re Application of
the United States, 2010 WL 5437209 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010) (Orenstein, Mag. J.).
298 [ Ariz. St. L.J.
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evaluation of the relative roles of courts and legislatures in setting
surveillance law rules.
Two caveats are in order at the outset. First, I focus on government
acquisition of communications and related data and leave aside the privacy
concerns raised by the collection and transfer of data by private parties. The
latter topic involves distinct concerns and thus deserves more extensive
treatment than this Essay can provide. Second, to the extent that my
analysis teases certain surveillance law patterns out of executive, legislative,
and judicial action in this area, it is vulnerable to the charge that we lack a
sufficient number of episodes to generalize about how institutions interact.
My goal, however, is to provide a useful lens for viewing the surveillance
law landscape, not to provide a complete or definitive account of
institutional interactions in this area.
A. The Communications Surveillance Law Landscape
The Supreme Court wrestled with the Fourth Amendment's application
to communications surveillance activities as early as 1928, holding in
Olmstead v. United States that a wiretap not effected through a trespass onto
private property did not violate the Fourth Amendment." In 1967, the Court
decided two cases that would shape the constitutional and statutory
frameworks for wiretapping and eavesdropping activities. In Berger v. New
York, the Court concluded that using an electronic listening device to
capture conversations in an office was a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment.1 6 The Court further held that the New York statute authorizing
courts to grant surveillance orders was constitutionally deficient.17 The next
term, in Katz v. United States, the Court held that the use of an electronic
listening device to capture a conversation is a search, even when the
placement of the device (in this case, in a telephone booth) does not involve
a trespass into a private area. The Katz Court thus overruled Olmstead and
held that the test for a search is whether investigators invade the "privacy
upon which [a target] justifiably relie[d]."l9 As refined in Justice Harlan's
concurrence20 and in subsequent cases, the test for whether an investigative
15. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
16. 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
17. Id. at 54-60.
18. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43:0293] 299
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technique constitutes a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is
whether the technique invades a reasonable expectation of privacy.2'
In the wake of Berger and Katz, Congress adopted Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,22 known as Title III
or the Wiretap Act. The statute generally prohibits the "intentional
intercept[ion]" of communications, but sets forth procedures under which
investigators can seek a court order authorizing surveillance.23
Although the Wiretap Act strictly regulates the interception of
communications, other forms of communications surveillance are not
regulated as strictly. More specifically, the Wiretap Act has been
understood to govern only the acquisition in transmission of the contents of
communications in criminal investigations. Exploring each area outside of
the Wiretap Act's coverage provides a good introduction to the rest of the
communications surveillance law landscape.
Transmission vs. Storage. The Wiretap Act governs the "intercept[ion]"
of communications, a term defined as the "aural or other acquisition of the
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device."24 Although this definition does
not specify that an "interception" occurs only when a communication is
seized contemporaneously with its transmission, a number of courts have so
held.2 5 A separate statutory framework, adopted as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA")26 and commonly known as
the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), regulates the privacy of stored
communications. In addition to barring unauthorized acquisition of such
communications, the statute authorizes government officials to compel
service providers to disclose the contents of a subscriber's communications
if certain requirements are met. In some cases-when the communications
in question are "in electronic storage" with the provider of an electronic
communication service for 180 days or less-investigators must obtain a
warrant before compelling production of the communications.2 7 As I will
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
22. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 211, 214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-22 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
23. See 1 JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
§§ 1:10-:15 (2010); Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1490 (2004).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
25. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003);
United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (11th Cir. 2003); Steve Jackson Games, Inc.
v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994).
26. Pub. L. No. 99-508, §§ 201-02, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-09, 2711-12 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
[ Ariz. St. L.J.300
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discuss below, it is unclear precisely what communications qualify as
communications "in electronic storage;" officials can compel production of
communications not in electronic storage on far lower standards, including
by obtaining a court order that falls short of the requirements for a
warrant. 28 Especially for electronic communications, one could argue that
the prospective acquisition of communications during transmission (under
the Wiretap Act) and the retrospective acquisition of past communications
(under the SCA) will yield precisely the same result. The SCA does not
proceed from that premise, however, and only recently have courts begun to
grapple with the statute's constitutionality.2 9
Noncontent Information. The Wiretap Act governs only the interception
of the contents of a communication, defined as any information "concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."30 What we
might call communications "attributes"" -such as information about the
phone number associated with an incoming or outgoing call or about the
source or destination of an electronic communication-are typically outside
of this statutory definition. The divergent treatment between
communications contents and attributes arises in part from the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland.3 2 In that case, the Supreme Court
held that the installation of a "pen register"-understood at the time to
mean a device that detects the numbers dialed in an outgoing phone call-
was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore did not
require a warrant.33 When Congress adopted ECPA, it added statutory
requirements for the installation of pen registers as well as "trap-and-trace
devices" (i.e., devices used to detect the number of an incoming call). As
amended, the provisions regulate devices that detect the "dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information" associated with incoming or
outgoing wire and electronic communications. 34 The provisions do not
require a warrant; rather, investigators can obtain a court order authorizing
the installation of a pen register or a trap-and-trace device based upon a
28. See infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
29. Compare United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), and Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on reh'g en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.
2008), with Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1282 (11th Cir. 2010), and In re Application of
the United States of America for a Search Warrant for Contents of Electronic Mail, 665 F. Supp.
2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
31. See Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital
Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 949 (1996) (defining term).
32. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
33. Id. at 740.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4).
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showing that the information sought "is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation."3  Similarly, when investigators seek not to acquire
communications attributes prospectively, but rather to collect such
information retrospectively from a service provider, the SCA permits
investigators to compel disclosure of the information without a warrant and
on a standard of relevance to an ongoing investigation.36
Another category of ostensibly "noncontent" information raises a distinct
set of statutory (and perhaps constitutional) concerns--cell-site location
information ("CSLI"). In theory, information on the location of cell towers
"hit" by a suspect's cell phone is "signaling" information about the origin of
a communication, and thus would fall within the scope of the pen/trap
statute. A separate federal statute, the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), however, precludes investigators from
using the pen/trap statute as the sole basis for acquiring information "that
may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent
that the location may be determined from the telephone number).""
Because CSLI can be "triangulated" to produce information on the cell
phone's location-and thus the target's location-CALEA bars the use of
the pen/trap statute in this context. As I discuss later, precisely what statutes
investigators must use to gather (or compel a service provider to produce)
such "cell-site location information" ("CSLI") has been a matter of dispute
for several years.39 Moreover, citing changes in technology that increase the
precision with which CSLI will identify a subscriber's location, two courts
have recently held that apart from any questions of statutory interpretation,
the Fourth Amendment itself requires investigators seeking CSLI to obtain
a warrant.4 0
35. Id. § 3122(b)(2).
36. More specifically, investigators can compel disclosure of records or other information
pertaining to a subscriber through a warrant or a court order issued under § 2703(d) of the SCA.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A), (B) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). An order under section 2703(d)
requires a showing of "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that" the information sought is "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). For certain categories of noncontent information,
only a subpoena is required. See id. § 2703(c)(2).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
38. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006).
39. See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
40. See In re Application of the United States, 2010 WL 4286365 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29,
2010) (Smith, Mag. J.); In re Application of the United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 27, 2010) (Orenstein, Mag. J.); see also In re Application of the United States, 2010 WL
5437209 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010) (Orenstein, Mag. J.) (adhering to logic of August 2010 case
despite its apparent reversal).
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Foreign Intelligence Investigations. The final area of the
communications surveillance law landscape concerns the authorities under
which investigators can acquire information for foreign intelligence
purposes, rather than for criminal investigations. In Katz v. United States,
the Supreme Court declined to address whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to national security investigations in the same way that it applies to
criminal investigations, observing that "[w]hether safeguards other than
prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in
a situation involving the national security is not presented by this case."4 1
Five years later, however, the Court had to confront the propriety of
warrantless national security surveillance directly. In United States v.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
(commonly known as the Keith case),42 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment barred the government from conducting warrantless
electronic surveillance to safeguard national security, at least when the
target was a domestic group lacking any connection to a foreign power.43
The Court left open whether warrantless surveillance could proceed in a
situation involving a foreign threat to national security.44 The Court also
noted that in national security cases, standards different from those
governing conventional search warrants might satisfy the Fourth
Amendment.45
In 1978, Congress addressed some of the issues the Keith Court left open
by passing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA").46 FISA
requires government officials who wish to use electronic surveillance to
gather "foreign intelligence information" regarding a foreign power or an
agent thereof to present a request to a special court, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ("FISC"). As will become clear, FISA's procedures,
while robust, differ from the Wiretap Act's procedures in important
respects.4 7
41. 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967); see also id. at 362-63 (White, J., concurring) (stating
that warrant requirement should not apply if the executive branch has authorized national
security surveillance as reasonable); id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that warrant
requirement should apply).
42. The case is so known for the name of the district court judge against whom the
government sought a writ of mandamus, Damon J. Keith.
43. 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
44. Id. at 308 (observing that case required "no judgment on the scope of the President's
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers").
45. Id. at 322.
46. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-12 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
47. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 738
(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002); Patricia L. Bellia, The "Lone Wolf" Amendment and the
Future ofForeign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. REv. 425, 441-42 (2005).
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B. Surveillance Law Patterns
With this sketch of the surveillance law landscape in place, it becomes
possible to identify certain institutional patterns that give rise to
constitutional questions about surveillance tactics. To be clear, my
argument is not that all communications surveillance law emerges from the
patterns I identify, nor that surveillance statutes cannot straddle multiple
categories. In light of the grey areas involved, I intend these patterns to
serve as a useful analytic tool rather than precise descriptors of the
surveillance law landscape. My classification of the various institutional
decisions involved depends in part on judgments about what particular
statutes accomplished-for example, responding to or attempting to
preempt executive or judicial action. I do not attempt to correlate the
statutes with claims about what the legislature intended, as opposed to what
a reasonable observer might perceive the legislature to have achieved. In
addition, I am concerned here only with constitutional questions about the
selection of rules for conducting surveillance activities, not constitutional
questions about the application of rules for conducting surveillance
activities in a particular factual situation. For example, I am interested in
categorizing challenges raising whether use of a particular surveillance
tactic should be subject to a standard of probable cause before a neutral
magistrate, not challenges raising whether that standard has been satisfied
in particular cases. Finally, for ease of describing the relevant patterns, I
focus on federal rather than state surveillance activities.
1. Executive Rule-Selection
I begin with disputes focusing on executive rule selection-that is, where
the executive branch adopts a surveillance practice in the absence of any
legislative action or outside the contours of existing statutes. In other words,
Congress has not specifically spoken with respect to the particular practice
at issue (or so the executive claims). Rather, it is left to the executive in the
first instance to decide whether the practice is sufficiently privacy-invasive
to require judicial authorization (and, if so, what kind of authorization to
seek) or whether it can risk proceeding without judicial involvement. When
the executive seeks judicial authorization under a too-weak standard, it runs
the risk that the authorizing court will reject the request or that a target will
successfully challenge the standard after the fact. When the executive does
not seek such authorization, it runs the risk that a target will challenge the
practice and claim that prior judicial authorization was necessary.
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Instances of executive rule-selection that ultimately triggered judicial
decisions on the constitutionality of executive conduct include the
following: certain wiretapping and eavesdropping activities until the
Court's decisions in Katz (and Berger v. New York48 in the immediately
preceding term);49 warrantless national security surveillance of purely
domestic targets in the era prior to the Keith decision; the use of pen
registers and similar devices before the Supreme Court's decision in Smith
v. Maryland;so the use of covert video surveillance tactics in the absence of
specific legislative authorization;" and the implementation of the NSA's
terrorist surveillance program outside of FISA's requirements.52
2. Legislative Rule-Selection
The remaining patterns involve legislative rule-selection rather than
executive rule-selection, but differ in terms of the conditions under which
the legislature selects a rule, and thus the posture in which a court must
consider the constitutionality of the rule.
a. Reactive statutes
In some cases, a legislature authorizes (or imposes limits upon)
surveillance practices in the wake of a prior judicial ruling on the
constitutional contours of government power. The statute is "reactive:" The
48. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
49. This example is complicated, because the Communications Act of 1934 provided that
"[n]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication." Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1104 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958)). Federal officials for decades interpreted the provision not to bar
wiretapping itself, but rather to bar the introduction of wiretap-derived evidence and its fruits
into court. See Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 9, at 28-31 (discussing the pre-Title
III history of wiretapping among state and federal officials).
50. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
51. See United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Koyomejian,
970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir.
1990); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-84 (7th Cir.
1984); see also infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
52. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd on other
grounds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). Executive conduct of this type can of course raise
statutory as well as constitutional questions. In other words, the question may be not only
whether the Fourth Amendment requires the executive to follow certain procedures, but also
whether a statute requires it to do so. Opponents of the NSA's terrorist surveillance program not
only claimed that the program violated the Fourth Amendment, but also that FISA (and thus
separation of powers principles) precluded it.
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legislature responds to the prior constitutional decision by defining the
circumstances in which the practice is permissible, and the executive
follows the legislatively prescribed procedures.
Reactive statutes can take two quite different forms, depending upon
whether the initial judicial decision approves or disapproves of the
executive practice that preceded it. If the initial judicial decision finds
existing procedures inadequate, the legislature must attempt to meet
whatever constitutional bar the court sets. In a sense, the statute codifies the
standards the court has articulated. If, however, the initial judicial decision
finds existing procedures fully adequate (as, for example, by determining
that the executive conduct in question is not a "search" for Fourth
Amendment purposes), the legislature may seek to provide more procedural
protections than a court has deemed the Fourth Amendment to require. We
might regard the statute as corrective-as intended to reset the level of
privacy protection to what the legislature perceives to be a more appropriate
level.
The Wiretap Act and arguably FISA fit the former category. Congress
adopted each statute in the wake of a Supreme Court decision that directly
limited executive discretion to use certain surveillance tactics-in
particular, to acquire communications in which a target could reasonably
expect privacy. The judicial decisions left some room for legislative
discretion, but made clear that the Fourth Amendment required robust
constraints on executive conduct. In the case of the Wiretap Act, the
protections Congress set essentially tracked those the Supreme Court
outlined in Berger v. New York." The statute at issue in Berger had allowed
court authorization of eavesdropping activities, but the Court found the
statutory procedures deficient in several respects. First, although the statute
required a showing of reasonable grounds to believe that the surveillance
would reveal evidence of criminal activity, the statute failed to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment requirement that the crime to be investigated, the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized be particularly
described.54 Second, the statute imposed no limitations on which
conversations could be seized or the duration of the surveillance, nor did it
require termination of surveillance activities once the goals of the
surveillance were met." Third, the statute allowed law enforcement
officials to secure renewal of a surveillance order on the basis of the initial
showing.56 Fourth, the statute did not provide for prior notice of the search
53. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
54. Id at 55-56.
55. Id. at 59-60.
56. Id. at 59.
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to the subject of the surveillance and required no showing of exigency to
justify the lack of notice." Finally, the statute did not provide for a "return"
on the warrant to a judge, "thereby leaving full discretion in the officer as to
the use of seized conversations of innocent as well as guilty parties.""
With the Wiretap Act, Congress sought to overcome each of these
deficiencies. The Wiretap Act requires that the application specify the
offense being investigated, the nature and location of the facilities where the
communications are to be intercepted, and a particular description of the
communications sought to be intercepted.5 9 To grant the order, the court
must find probable cause to believe that a particular enumerated offense is
being committed and that targeting the specified facility will yield particular
communications concerning that offense."o Congress dealt with Berger's
objection to the indeterminate length of surveillance under the New York
statute by providing that orders may authorize surveillance only as long as
necessary for achievement of the objective, up to thirty days.6 ' A court may
grant an extension, but only subject to the same showings and findings as
the original order. The statute also requires a court to order officials to
"minimize" the interception of communications unrelated to criminal
activity.
In light of Berger's objection that the New York statute required no
showing of exigency to justify the lack of notice, the Wiretap Act requires a
finding that normal investigative procedures are unlikely to be successful or
are too dangerous, and generally requires notice to the target of the
investigation within ninety days of the termination of the surveillance.
Finally, Congress required law enforcement officials to take a variety of
steps that provide the functional equivalent of a return to a judge. For
example, the Wiretap Act requires law enforcement officials to record
intercepted communications and to make the recordings available to the
judge.64 The statute also authorizes a judge to require periodic reports on the
progress of the surveillance. 5
The circumstances surrounding FISA's passage were slightly different,
because the Supreme Court never spoke directly to the question whether
warrantless national security surveillance of a foreign power or its agent
57. Id at 60.
58. Id
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (2006).
60. Id. § 2518(3).
61. Id § 2518(5).
62. Id.
63. Id §§ 2518(3)(c), (8)(d).
64. Id. § 2518(8)(a).
65. Id § 2518(6).
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violated the Fourth Amendment. 6 In Keith, however, the Court clarified
that national security surveillance of a domestic target must comply with the
Fourth Amendment. The Court acknowledged both that Congress could
tailor specific statutory requirements to the peculiarities of national security
surveillance67 and that Congress could properly place the power to review
surveillance applications in a specially designated court. Although
Congress never took up the Supreme Court's invitation to legislate distinct
standards for national security surveillance of a domestic target, it enacted
in FISA a special framework for surveillance of a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power.69 More specifically, it established a specialized court,
the FISC, to hear applications for electronic surveillance within the United
States to gather foreign intelligence information.70 In light of the Keith
court's acknowledgement that special standards could be appropriate even
for national security surveillance of domestic targets, FISA can be
understood as Congress's attempt to map the Court's reasoning in Keith
onto foreign intelligence gathering.
66. In post-Keith cases involving warrantless surveillance against foreign powers or their
agents to gather foreign intelligence information, three courts of appeals upheld the
government's activities. See United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Brown, 484
F.2d 418, 425 (5th Cir. 1973). A plurality of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however,
addressing an issue not squarely presented in the case before it, questioned whether there could
be any "foreign intelligence" exception to the warrant requirement. See Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d 594, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion).
67. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972) (recognizing that standards differing from those
governing electronic surveillance in criminal cases "may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens").
68. Id. at 323.
69. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-12 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
70. See id. §§ 1803(a), (a)(6)(A)-(B). The term "electronic surveillance" has a complex
definition, but essentially regulates acquisition of the contents of communications through the
monitoring of persons or the installation of surveillance devices within the United States. Id. §
1801(f); see Bellia, supra note 47, at 430 n.33. Rather than requiring a showing of probable
cause that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed, or that targeting the specified
facilities will yield communications relating to a crime, FISA requires a showing of probable
cause that the surveillance target is a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power," and that
the facilities are about to be used by such a power or agent. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4). There is
substantial but not complete overlap between activities that make a target a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power and those that constitute criminal activity. See Bellia, supra note 47, at
441.
71. Portions of the USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No.
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006), provide another example of a congressional effort to respond to
constitutionally-based judicial regulation of communications surveillance tactics. In September
2004, a district court held unconstitutional section 2709 of the Stored Communications Act,
which authorized FBI investigators to issue "national security letters" compelling
[ Ariz. St. L.J.308
DESIGNING SURVEILLANCE LAW
Several statutes fall within the second, "corrective" category of reactive
statutes-that is, providing additional statutory protection in response to a
judicial decision that approves executive conduct undertaken with few
procedural protections. As noted earlier, ECPA's pen/trap provisions were
in part a legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Maryland.7 2 The Court's holding would have permitted federal and state
officials (absent statutory constraints) to use pen registers and similar
devices without prior judicial authorization. The pen/trap device statute is
one of several statutes in which Congress sought to restore a measure of
procedural protection to activities that the Supreme Court deemed not to
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes."
b. Proactive statutes
In some cases, Congress has not awaited a judicial decision regarding
whether a particular executive tactic is constitutional; instead, it has sought
to preempt the executive's use of a particular tactic (and, by extension, a
court's assessment of it) by selecting the rule itself. Within this broad
category of "proactive" statutes, it is helpful to distinguish further between
two types: "modernizing" statutes-statutes that update surveillance law in
communications service providers to disclose certain transactional records concerning their
subscribers. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the court did not question the
FBI's authority to issue such letters, the statute contained a problematic nondisclosure provision
prohibiting the recipient of an NSL from disclosing the existence of an NSL to any person. The
district court concluded that the nondisclosure provision barred an NSL recipient from
consulting an attorney to comply with the terms of the NSL, that the provision therefore
violated the First and Fourth Amendments, and that the provision was not severable from the
remainder of the statute authorizing the issuance of NSLs.
The NSL provision was among the several provisions amended when Congress took up
reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act following the December 31, 2005, sunset date. More
specifically, the USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act loosened the
nondisclosure provision (as well as similar provisions in statutes authorizing NSLs in different
contexts) to allow disclosure to an attorney and other persons necessary for compliance with the
NSL. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 116, 120 Stat. at 213 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2006)). The act also provided statutory authorization for an NSL recipient to
challenge the scope of the NSL in court. Id. § 115, 120 Stat. 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3511).
72. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
73. Other examples, less directly relevant to a discussion of communications surveillance
tactics, include the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2006) (responding to
the Court's decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), finding no expectation of
privacy in bank records), and the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006)
(responding to the Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)). See
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for
Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753-60 (2005); Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead.
Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 916-17 (2004).
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light of technological developments-and "crisis response" statutes-
statutes that respond to a perceived investigative or intelligence failure by
authorizing particular surveillance techniques thought lacking in existing
law.
Modernizing statutes. Legislation updating surveillance law in light of
technological developments might include both provisions designed to limit
the use of particular surveillance techniques, on the theory that the law has
not caught up with technological developments; and provisions designed to
overcome technological obstacles to surveillance or to extend existing
surveillance regimes to new technologies.
ECPA was designed to bring surveillance law authorities into line with
technological developments."4 The first portion of that statute amended the
Wiretap Act, which initially protected only wire and oral communications,
to cover interception of electronic communications as well." The second
segment of the statute, the SCA, established independent protections for
stored wire and electronic communications.7 6
These portions of ECPA reflect Congress's recognition that development
and adoption of new communications technologies depended upon public
perceptions that such communications were secure from private and
governmental interception." The amendments to the Wiretap Act put
electronic communications on nearly the same footing as wire and oral
communications." Similarly, the purpose of the SCA was to make stored
74. See, e.g., 131 Cong. Rec. 24,365-66 (1985) (statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at 24,396
(1985) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). For a fuller discussion of ECPA's goals, see Brief on
Rehearing En Banc for Senator Patrick J. Leahy as Amicus Curiae Supporting the United States
and Urging Reversal, United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (No.
03-1383).
75. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, §§ 101-11, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-59
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (2006 & Supp. 1112009)).
76. Electronic Communications Privacy Act §§ 201-02, 100 Stat. at 1860-68 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-09, 2711-12 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
77. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559;
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
78. As a concession to the Justice Department, the amendments did not apply all features
of the Wiretap Act to electronic communications, but they came close. See S. REP. No. 99-541,
at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3577. There are three primary differences. First, §
2516(1) specifies the range of federal felonies for which government officials can seek orders to
engage in surveillance of wire and oral communications. Although that list has grown
considerably since the Wiretap Act's enactment in 1968, it does not encompass all federal
felonies. Under § 2516(3), however, law enforcement officials are authorized to seek Title III
orders for surveillance of electronic communications in connection with any federal felony.
Second, § 2516(1) also requires approval of certain high-level officials in the Justice
Department before a request for surveillance of wire and oral communications can be sought
from a court. No similar statutory restriction exists in § 2516(3) for surveillance of electronic
communications, although the Justice Department has abided by such a restriction as a matter of
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communications less vulnerable to unauthorized acquisition, while
preserving law enforcement access to such communications. 9
ECPA also included examples of provisions designed to overcome
technical impediments to surveillance. Section 106(d)(3), for example,
added a provision loosening one of the particularity showings required for a
Title III order, thus permitting "roving" surveillance where agents could
demonstrate evidence that a target's activities would otherwise thwart
surveillance.so Eight years later, Congress dealt more directly with the
perceived problem of technical developments eroding surveillance
capabilities. CALEA, adopted in 1994, facilitated otherwise lawful
surveillance orders by requiring telecommunications providers to design
their systems to accommodate requests to intercept communications or
obtain call identifying information associated with those communications."'
Portions of the USA Patriot Act perhaps provide a final example of a
modernizing statute. Although Congress clearly sought to respond to some
perceived gaps in surveillance law in the wake of the September 11, 2001,
attacks, some portions of the statute had been discussed and proposed for
years prior to those attacks. For example, the USA Patriot Act extended the
pen/trap device statute to cover addressing and signaling information
associated with electronic communications.8 2 Government agents had
previously sought such information through requests that courts issue orders
under the pen/trap device statute, despite language ostensibly limiting that
statute's reach to wire communications.84 Although no court had yet
policy. Finally, §§ 2515 and 2518(10) bar the use in evidence of wire and oral communications
obtained in violation of the statute or in violation of a Title III order. No statutory suppression
remedy exists for interception of electronic communications in violation of the statute.
79. The legislative reports accompanying ECPA acknowledged the legal uncertainty
surrounding whether and how the Fourth Amendment might protect such communications. See
Bellia, supra note 23, at 1413 (discussing conflicting views of whether subscribers retain an
expectation of privacy in communications in the hands of a third party).
80. Electronic Communications Privacy Act § 106(d)(3), 100 Stat. at 1857 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (2006)).
81. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279, 4280 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)-(2) (2006)). For discussion of the statute's
enactment and implementation, see Lillian R. BeVier, The Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994: A Surprising Sequel to the Breakup ofAT&T, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(1999); Freiwald, supra note 31.
82. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216,
115 Stat. 272, 288-89.
83. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 633-34 (2003).
84. More specifically, the original statute defined a pen register as a device that "records
or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006)
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rejected the government's interpretation, the Justice Department included a
codification of this interpretation in a package of measures proposed in
response to the September 11 attacks."
Crisis response statutes. Proactive legislative responses to perceived
investigative or intelligence failures would likely include several of the
amendments to FISA. As first enacted in 1978, FISA covered only
electronic surveillance of foreign powers or agents of foreign powers.86 In a
series of amendments in the 1990s, Congress added three new titles to
FISA, one allowing the FISC to approve physical searches,8 7 one allowing
the FISC to approve the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices,"
and one allowing the FISC to approve the compelled production of certain
business records." Each title responded to particular intelligence failures
that the executive identified or that Congress perceived (or to concerns that
government tactics undertaken without judicial authorization would
subsequently be rejected in court)." For this Essay's focus on
(emphasis added). On the other hand, the statute defined a trap-and-trace device as a device to
capture the "originating number" from which "a wire or electronic communication was
transmitted." Id. § 3127(4) (emphasis added).
85. Consultation and Discussion Draft Bill to Combat Terrorism and Defend the Nation
Against Terrorist Acts, and for Other Purposes (Sept. 19, 2001), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ata200ltext.pdf.
86. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 1793 (1978).
87. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807, 108
Stat. 3423, 3443 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-29 (2006 & Supp. III
2009)).
88. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601, 112
Stat. 2396, 2405 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-46 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
89. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, § 602, 112 Stat. at 2410 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2000)). The amendment initially covered compelled production of travel-
related business records, but was broadened in the USA Patriot Act to cover production of
"tangible things" held by a third party. See USA Patriot Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)) (deleting former §§ 1861-63 and
adding new §§ 1861-62 authorizing orders to compel production of tangible things).
90. For example, the physical search provisions arose after government officials
conducted covert physical searches without judicial authorization during their investigation of
spying accusations against Aldrich Ames. The Justice Department apparently feared that a court
would question the legality of such searches in a criminal trial against Ames. See S. REP. No.
103-296, at 40 (1994). Ames's guilty plea obviated the need for a court to consider the issue, but
the Justice Department sought an amendment to FISA to provide an avenue for such searches to
occur pursuant to a FISC order. Id. The physical search provisions of FISA apparently can serve
as a basis for certain forms of communications surveillance, in that government officials can use
them to obtain copies of stored communications from service providers.
The provision authorizing agents to seek orders from the FISC compelling disclosure of
certain business records may have arisen indirectly from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. At
the time of the bombing, which some investigators initially theorized could be the work of
foreign terrorists, there was no mechanism to compel production of business records (such as
truck rental records) in an investigation involving an agent of a foreign power or an
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communications surveillance tactics, the most relevant of these titles is the
1998 amendment authorizing the FISC to approve requests for the use of
pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. The pen register and trap-and-trace
amendment followed an incident in which investigators seeking the source
of certain hacking activities that appeared to originate overseas could not
get a foreign intelligence-related order to trace those activities without
meeting the full requirements of FISA.9' The amendment thus created for
foreign intelligence investigations an authorization procedure similar to that
available through adoption of the criminal pen/trap statute in 1986.92 Under
the new provision, investigators could request from the FISC an order
permitting the use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device on a lower
predicate than was required for the gathering of the contents of
communications. 9 3
Portions of the USA Patriot Act also serve as obvious examples of the
crisis response model. Among the Act's provisions were several responding
to perceived intelligence failures in connection with the September 11
attacks. Perhaps the most controversial of these provisions was the
provision dismantling the "wall" that separated criminal investigators and
counterintelligence investigators within the Justice Department and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in investigations involving FISA. 94 The
USA Patriot Act similarly loosened restrictions in the Wiretap Act on the
sharing of information among agencies. Before September 11, the Justice
Department had construed a Wiretap Act provision authorizing law
enforcement officials to share intercepted communications with "another
international terrorist. See S. REP. No. 105-185, at 28-29 (1998); cf Peter P. Swire, The System
of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1306, 1329 (2004). The
amendment thus allowed investigators to apply for an order requiring disclosure of travel-
related records, such as rental car records, storage facility records, and so on. Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2000)); see supra note 89 (noting expansion of provision).
91. The incident, which occurred in February 1998, allegedly involved an Israeli teenager
acting in concert with two American teenagers. See Putting a Face on "Analyzer": The Alleged
Teen Pentagon Hacker is Called Brilliant But Dangerous, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 1998).
92. S. REP. No. 105-185, at 27-28.
93. Other amendments to FISA likewise responded to specific investigative incidents,
including a 2000 enactment (1) requiring the Attorney General, upon the request of certain high-
level officials (including the Director of the FBI), personally to review a FISA application; and
(2) specifying that the FISC could consider a target's past activities in determining whether
there is probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.
See Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, §§ 601-02, 114 Stat.
2831, 2850-52 (2000). These changes responded to a perceived failure in the handling of the
Wen Ho Lee matter. See S. REP. No. 106-352 (2000).
94. See Bellia, supra note 47, at 452-56; infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
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investigative or law enforcement officer"" restrictively. The provision
permitted disclosure "to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the
proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving
the disclosure." 96 The Department of Justice concluded that criminal
investigators could share information acquired under the Wiretap Act in
order to acquire from intelligence officials information relevant to the
criminal investigation.97 Officials could not, however, turn the fruits of
electronic surveillance over to intelligence agencies on a wholesale basis.98
The USA Patriot Act added language specifically allowing disclosure of the
fruits of Title III surveillance to intelligence officials and others.99
A final example of a crisis response provision is the post-Patriot Act
"lone wolf' amendment. As enacted, FISA defined the term "agent of a
foreign power" to include individuals acting on behalf of a terrorist group,
not simply individual terrorists. oo As a result, to secure a FISA order for
surveillance of a suspected terrorist, agents had to demonstrate a link
between the target and a specific terrorist group. Immediately prior to the
September 11 attacks, this requirement proved an impediment to FBI agents
who wished to secure a FISA physical search order to examine the contents
of a laptop seized from Zacharias Moussaoui, whose suspicious behavior at
a Minnesota flight school had prompted investigators to arrest him for an
immigration violation shortly before the attacks.'' Adopted in 2004 as part
of a broader intelligence bill, the lone wolf amendment expanded FISA's
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (2006).
96. Id.
97. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Office of Intelligence Policy & Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sharing
Title Ill Electronic Surveillance Material with the Intelligence Community, 2000 WL 33716983
(Oct. 17, 2000)
98. Id.; see also Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1181 n.236 (2004).
99. USA Patriot Act § 203(b), 115 Stat. at 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2006))
(allowing disclosure to "any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or national security official" to assist the receiving official in the
performance of his official duties).
100. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(C) (2006).
101. See Bellia, supra note 47, at 425; see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSIoN REPORT, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 274 (2004). In the
immediate aftermath of the attacks, Moussaoui was thought to be the "missing" twentieth
hijacker-the fifth member of the team assembled to hijack United Airlines Flight 93 out of
Newark, which ultimately crashed in rural Pennsylvania. See Philip Shenon, The 20th Suspect,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at B5. More recent evidence suggests that the fifth member of that
flight team was in fact intended to be Mohamed al Kahtani, who was refused entry into the
United States on August 4, 2001. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 456 n.73 (identifying
the Moussaoui as a potential substitute pilot for United Airlines Flight 93).
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definition of the term "agent of a foreign power" to include an individual
terrorist who is not shown to be working on behalf of a group.'02 The lone
wolf amendment thus relieved investigators of the burden of proving that
one who engages in terrorist activities does so on behalf of a terrorist
organization. Discussion of the amendment during hearings focused on the
evidentiary burden that investigators faced in proving a connection with a
terrorist organization in an era of looser, less centrally controlled terrorist
groups. 0 3
C. Understanding the Judicial Landscape
Analyzing judicial outcomes through the lens of the institutional patterns
outlined above permits a more nuanced view of executive, legislative, and
judicial roles in regulating surveillance tactics. The graphics below reflect
different postures in which a court might be called upon to assess a
government investigator's use of a particular surveillance technique. Each
graphic presumes that the executive branch chooses in the first instance
what procedures, if any, to follow before engaging in communications
surveillance. If a court reviews the executive's implementation of whatever
rule it selects, the legislature might react to the judicial decision, and a
further challenge to the executive's implementation of the legislatively
selected rule will follow. In other cases, the legislature will respond
proactively to the executive's rule selection before a court has acted, and
judicial review will only follow once the executive implements the
legislatively chosen rule.
102. More specifically, the measure broadened the definition of "agent of a foreign power"
to include any non-U.S. person who "engages in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefore [sic]." Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 6001(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1801(b)(1)(C) (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
103. See, e.g., Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings on S.
2586 and S. 2659 Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 14-19, 20-21 (2003)
(statement and testimony of Marion E. "Spike" Bowman, Deputy General Counsel, FBI).
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To the extent that normative arguments about how courts and Congress
should regulate surveillance rest on an assessment of how courts have
treated constitutional challenges to communications surveillance tactics
since Katz, the patterns prove helpful in evaluating those assessments. The
premise among judicial abdication scholars is that the surveillance law
landscapes reflects judicial under-enforcement of Fourth Amendment
guarantees; the premise among legislative supremacy scholars is that the
surveillance law landscape reflects appropriate judicial deference. Yet to
evaluate claims about under-enforcement or deference, it becomes
necessary to know more about what precisely a court is evaluating. Judicial
evaluation of the constitutionality of a surveillance tactic can arise in
response to implementation of a rule selected by the executive, a rule
selected by the legislature to meet or exceed the contours of a judicial
decision (a codifying or corrective statute), or a rule selected by the
legislature in an effort to be proactive (to modernize surveillance authorities
or respond to a crisis). It is not surprising to find different levels of judicial
intervention depending on the phase in which the claim arises.
A set of claims that Professor Kerr, who argues for legislative supremacy
in surveillance law, makes about deference illustrates scholars' tendency to
generalize about judicial responses in quite different circumstances. As
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evidence of a trend of judicial deference, Professor Kerr notesl0 4 that: (1)
Congressional action followed soon after the Berger, Katz, and Keith
decisions, and statutory regulation thus supplanted judicial regulation of the
techniques involved; (2) post-Berger and Katz challenges to the Wiretap
Act have failed, including both facial challenges"o' and challenges to
specific statutory gaps (such as the exclusion of cordless phones from the
statute until 1994106); and (3) courts have regulated covert video
surveillance tactics not by articulating new standards but by relying upon
those already appearing in the Wiretap Act, despite the fact that the statute
clearly exempts video surveillance.o 7 As a descriptive matter, we could
characterize these developments differently-with different implications for
a normative assessment of the respective roles of legislatures and courts in
regulating surveillance activities.
1. Executive Rule-Selection
First, when a court evaluates the executive's choice of a rule to govern a
particular surveillance tactic before the legislature has spoken-when it
evaluates executive action-it faces a different question of deference than it
does in response to implementation of a legislatively chosen rule. Neither a
court nor a legislature has assessed the privacy implications of the practice.
Unsurprisingly, we do find some significant judicial activity in this
category. Berger, Katz, and Keith provide examples of such activity, as does
the district court decision declaring the NSA terrorist surveillance program
unconstitutional."o0 Legislative action, of course, followed the Berger, Katz,
104. I leave aside here two arguments that I believe have little bearing on analysis of the
relative roles of courts and legislatures in communications surveillance law: that courts refused
to imply a civil remedy for a violation of the Wiretap Act in Adams v. City of Battle Creek, and
that even outside of the core concern of domestic wiretapping, courts have looked to statutory
law in permitting compliance with foreign statutes to satisfy Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standards. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 853. The first example does not involve a threshold
determination that a reasonable expectation does or does not apply and is thus inapposite. Even
if the foreign law examples involve deference to statutory law, they do not advance Professor
Kerr's central claim that courts have historically deferred to congressional judgments about
surveillance law.
105. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 850 ("The judiciary's deferential stance began with the
case law that followed the passage of Title III.").
106. Id. at 852 ("[T]he courts refused to say that the Fourth Amendment covered the ground
that Congress had not protected: instead, the courts deferred to Congress's judgment and held
that such calls were not covered by the Fourth Amendment.").
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (2), (12) (2006) (defining "wire," "oral," and "electronic"
communications).
108. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd on other
grounds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
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and Keith decisions, and case-by-case adjudication of surveillance
techniques yielded to the Wiretap Act and FISA. But judicial decisions
framed that legislation, and the reactive nature of the legislation makes it
difficult to characterize courts' posture in this context as deferential.
Similarly, the covert video surveillance cases reflect courts'
determination that the technique invades a reasonable expectation of
privacy and that agents must meet stringent procedural requirements to use
it.' 09 Congress placed video surveillance outside of the ambit of the Wiretap
Act, but courts imposed the Wiretap Act's requirements anyway. To be
sure, courts adopted the Wiretap Act's requirements rather than developing
new judicial standards. "0 Adoption of those requirements, however, was
premised upon the threshold determination that the technique invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy. That determination is one that Professor
Kerr implicitly expects, if not explicitly urges, courts to leave to the
legislature. As a descriptive matter, then, the example is not one of
deference to legislative choices.
Of course, courts do not always respond to executive rule-selection by
demanding stringent procedures. For example, many scholars have
criticized the Supreme Court's determination in Smith v. Maryland that the
Fourth Amendment permits warrantless use of pen registers and similar
devices."' Because my primary goal here is to set the stage for a discussion
of institutional competence in surveillance questions, I am less interested in
the merits of this dispute than in what it tells us about the relative roles of
courts and legislatures." 2 The Smith example in fact illustrates the
tremendous power of a court's initial determination whether a surveillance
tactic invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although Congress soon
adopted standards that exceeded those that the Supreme Court found the
Fourth Amendment to require, those standards did not remotely
approximate the standards that would have prevailed had Smith been
decided otherwise. In other words, the Court's decision in Smith obviated
the need for Congress to provide more robust procedures. That Congress
chose to exceed those the court required did not make it the primary
architect of the surveillance law scheme; rather, the Court's Fourth
Amendment determination established the framework within which
Congress legislated.
109. See supra note 51 (citing cases).
110. Kerr, supra note 10, at 854.
111. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 31, at 949, 982-89; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers
and the Dissipation ofFourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1137-38 (2002).
112. I have discussed the shaky doctrinal underpinnings of Smith v. Maryland elsewhere.
See Bellia, supra note 23, at 1397-1413.
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2. Legislative Rule-Selection
a. Reactive statutes
Moving to reactive statutes, it is true as a descriptive matter that courts
have often rejected constitutionally-based challenges to such statutes. The
absence of successful constitutional challenges in this context, however,
does not necessarily signal either judicial under-enforcement or judicial
deference to legislative choices.
In the case of a codifying statute, when a court has disapproved of a
particular executive tactic and the legislature responds by implementing the
judicial decision, further judicial intervention on constitutional grounds
seems quite unlikely, especially if there is evidence that the legislative
branch (and the executive branch) fully considered the constitutional issues
in light of the court's pronouncements. The Wiretap Act, as noted, was
drafted with Berger very much in mind, and the statute's formidable
statutory protections match or exceed features of a warrant." The failure of
challenges to the statutory scheme may reflect some deference to
Congress's assessment of constitutional requirements, despite courts'
claims not to give decisive weight to such interpretations. Or that reluctance
may simply reflect the fact that Congress (and its partners in the executive
branch) interpreted and applied the same body of constitutional law as the
courts and correctly assessed the constitutional issue.
Similarly, if a court approves of particular executive conduct undertaken
with few procedural safeguards, it is unlikely to invalidate a reactive
legislative rule that seeks to correct the judicial decision by enhancing those
safeguards.
In short, very little can be gleaned from the absence of successful
constitutional challenges to reactive statutes. Whether such examples reflect
judicial under-enforcement links back to the judicial decision on the rule
selected by the executive in the first instance. Deference to legislative
decisions may be a factor in such cases, but it is difficult to isolate
legislative deference in such cases because the legislative choices are
intertwined with the judicial decisions that preceded them.
b. Proactive Statutes
Proactive statutes raise more difficult questions. Here, Congress seeks to
develop a Fourth Amendment-compliant framework without a prior judicial
113. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text; Kerr, supra note 10, at 851; see also
Bellia, supra note 23, at 1388-91 (describing protections).
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determination whether use of a surveillance tactic invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy. If Fourth Amendment challenges are unsuccessful in
this context, it cannot be because courts and the political branches are
simply relying on the same clearly authoritative sources of law to assess the
issue. No well-developed law exists. As a result, it becomes difficult to
distinguish instances of appropriate judicial deference to Congress from
inappropriate judicial under-enforcement of Fourth Amendment guarantees.
Within the two categories of "proactive" statutes, however, it is possible
to identify certain points at which judicial under-enforcement is a risk.
Consider the two types of judgments that Congress must make in drafting a
modernizing statute. Congress first must make factual judgments about the
state of technology; it then must make normative judgments about how
much privacy protection is warranted in light of those facts. When a court
initially considers the constitutionality of a modernizing statute, it is
unlikely to question Congress's recent factual judgments. Rather, its main
task will be to evaluate Congress's judgment about how much privacy
protection is warranted-that is, about whether users of a particular
communications technology can reasonably expect privacy in that
technology.
There are a number of reasons why courts might be unlikely to dislodge
that judgment. First, if a court applying the reasonable expectation of
privacy test takes a positive approach rather than a normative one-asking
what privacy users do expect rather than what they are entitled to expect-
then a court's inquiry necessarily becomes an empirical one, requiring
consideration of (among other things) society's perceptions of the
vulnerability of communications to unauthorized acquisition. Engaging in
such an inquiry with respect to an emerging communications medium
requires an empirical analysis by a court to assess what society's
perceptions are.' 14 Even if a court were equipped to undertake this empirical
assessment, inquiring into the vulnerability of a communications medium
slants the inquiry against constitutionally-based judicial regulation of new
technology, for it will be rare for society not to perceive a new
communications medium to be vulnerable.
As time goes on, moreover, it may become increasingly difficult for a
court to dislodge erroneous congressional judgments about the path of
technology. Assume that the path of technology veers away from
Congress's initial predictions-and thus calls into question congressional
decisions about how much privacy protection is warranted. Assume also
114. Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, supra note 9, T 22-45
(discussing difficulties of the positive versus normative inquiry into the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy).
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that courts rejected initial constitutional challenges to the statutory scheme.
Whether early decisions about the constitutionality of a statute explicitly or
implicitly deferred to Congress's judgment on the underlying facts about
the state of technology, or merely came to the same conclusion as Congress
did, those decisions will be difficult to dislodge once the statute has been on
the books and has gone unquestioned for many years. To hold that the
statutory scheme sets inadequate procedures, the court must question a
factual judgment that was unquestionable at the time it was made, or
generate new empirical assessments about society's perceptions of the
medium's vulnerability.
In short, when properly presented with a challenge to a modernizing
statute, a court may simply be deferring to Congress's superior expertise to
set flexible and adequately protective rules. On the other hand, the case may
be one of judicial under-enforcement. Over time, moreover, the facts may
shift such that appropriate deference becomes under-enforcement, as the
nature of the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry and the fact that a
statute has been on the books for many years combine to make the statute
difficult to dislodge.
The SCA's framework for compelled disclosure of the contents of
communications illustrates some of these difficulties. As noted earlier, the
SCA permits government officials to compel a service provider to disclose a
subscriber's communications under certain circumstances. For
communications in "electronic storage" for 180 days or less, a warrant
requirement applies."' For communications not in "electronic storage," a
court order issued on standards short of those required for a warrant will
suffice.1 16 The government's traditional view was that the "electronic
storage" category encompassed a relatively small category of electronic
communications-not all e-mails, but only those communications not yet
downloaded from the provider's server.1'7 All other messages, including
messages opened by the subscriber but retained on the server and sent
messages retained on the server, could be retrieved without a warrant.1 18
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
116. Id. § 2703(b), (d).
117. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 123 (3rd ed. 2009) [hereinafter CCIPS MANUAL], available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf (stating that
"[electronic storage] does not include post-transmission storage of communications").
118. Id. at 124 ("Once the recipient retrieves the email, however, the communication
reaches its final destination. If the recipient chooses to retain a copy of the accessed
communication, the copy will not be in 'temporary, intermediate storage' and is not stored
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Such messages, in the government's view, were communications held or
maintained by a remote computing service-a category less well protected
by the statute. 19
At the time of ECPA's adoption, the narrow interpretation of the term
"electronic storage" might have been unproblematic. In 1986, electronic
communications were not widely used for personal purposes. 120 At the time,
moreover, the term "remote computing service" fit comfortably with the
ways in which businesses might treat certain records. Because computing
capacity and storage was still relatively expensive, a business might
outsource certain processing and data storage tasks, and the statute treated a
company that performs such storage and processing services as the provider
of a "remote computing service."l21 Communications held by a remote
computing service would typically be business records for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment-that is, records held by a third party and not
communications in which a subscriber could have a reasonable expectation
of privacy.122
In short, the SCA contemplated both short-term storage of
communications with an electronic communications service, and longer-
term storage of records with a remote computing service. The technological
environment within which the SCA's distinctions apply has changed
dramatically, inasmuch as long-term storage of personal communications is
now a norm. 12 In 1986, it was likely that users would have had to take
affirmative steps to retain e-mail messages they already accessed.12 4 Storage
is now extremely cheap, and e-mail services such as Gmail base their entire
business models on the proposition that users can and should have access to
a searchable database of all of their e-mails-read or unread. If the Justice
Department's interpretation still prevails, however, all opened or sent
incident to transmission. . .. By the same reasoning, if the sender of an email maintains a copy
of the sent email, the copy will not be in 'electronic storage."') (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 126. The "remote computing service" category applies only if the provider offers
services to the public. In other cases, a message in post-transmission storage would be
unprotected by the SCA. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006) (defining "remote computing
service" as an entity that provides computer storage or processing services "to the public").
120. See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1557, 1567 (2004) (noting that e-mail users in 1986 were primarily academics, military
personnel, and some business people).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
122. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see also Bellia, supra note 23, at
1397-1413 (discussing Miller); Mulligan, supra note 120, at 1569.
123. See Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 137,
147-49 (2008).
124. Mulligan, supra note 120, at 1569.
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messages that remain on systems like Gmail are not subject to the higher
warrant-like protections of section 2703(a) of the SCA.
A court addressing a constitutional challenge to the Justice Department's
interpretation faces a dilemma. The technical assumptions undergirding the
original statute-that long-term storage of electronic communications
would not occur, and that communications held by a remote computing
service are easily classified as business records-no longer hold. Any court
asked to approve a 2703(d) order for e-mail that, under the government's
interpretation, is outside of the electronic surveillance definition implicitly
passes on the constitutionality of the government's position. Yet that
position, even if erroneous, will be difficult to dislodge. In the first case to
squarely address the constitutionality of the government's position,
Warshak v. United States, the government quite naturally pointed out that,
in twenty years, no court had ever declared these provisions of the SCA
unconstitutional.125 The case law in this area remains unstable.'2 6 Indeed, it
is interesting that the major limit on the government's conduct-at least
before Warshak-came not from case-by-case adjudication in disputes
involving criminal defendants, but (arguably erroneous) statutory
construction in a civil dispute. 127
As with the other categories of statutes, I am less interested in the merits
of the SCA dispute than I am in what it shows about the interplay of the
legislative and judicial branches. A legislative supremacy scholar would
argue that the absence until very recently of judicial intervention, and the
current instability in the case law, demonstrates Congress's superiority in
setting flexible and adequately protective rules for developing technologies.
A judicial abdication scholar would detect under-enforcement. When the
SCA is viewed as a modernizing statute, a third possibility suggests itself-
that the shifting technological landscape has destabilized the structure of a
statute that was once plausibly viewed as constitutional.
125. Brief for Defendant-Appellant United States at 14, Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d
455 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4092) ("For twenty years, the Stored Communications Act has set
forth the procedures for the government to follow to compel disclosure of e-mail, and no court
has previously found it to be unconstitutional.").
126. Compare United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), and Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on reh'g en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.
2008), with Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1282 (11th Cir. 2010), and In re Application of
the United States of America for a Search Warrant for Contents of Electronic Mail, 665 F. Supp.
2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009).
127. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied and opinion
superseded, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of the difficulties the Theofel
court's opinion raises, see Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283, 1335-38 (2005).
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Crisis response statutes. In the other category of proactive statutes-
those involving Congress's response to a perceived gap in investigators'
surveillance authorities-we likewise see little constitutionally-based
regulation. Again, however, we can identify specific challenges such
statutes present for courts.
Like modernizing statutes, crisis response statutes reflect two distinct
congressional judgments. The first is a judgment about whether a particular
tactic is sufficiently invasive to require prior judicial authorization (and if
so, on what standard). The second is a judgment about the urgency of the
need for the investigative tool.
These judgments are so closely tied together-particularly on the foreign
intelligence side-that a court inquiring into the first may end up unraveling
the second. On the foreign intelligence side, the prevailing doctrinal test
gives great weight to investigative needs. Keith explicitly contemplates that
national security investigations may present "different policy and practical
considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime"'l 28  and
contemplates that those considerations permit standards different from those
governing surveillance in criminal cases, so long as those standards "are
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens."l 29 This test
remains underdeveloped in the law and, as a result, operates as a fairly soft
limit on congressional action.130
Courts' reluctance to question the constitutionality of the Patriot Act
amendments to FISA illustrates the challenges of reviewing a crisis
response statute in the foreign intelligence area. The Patriot Act amended
FISA to permit surveillance to proceed on a national security official's
certification that a "significant purpose" of the surveillance, rather than "the
purpose" of the surveillance, is to acquire foreign intelligence information.
A pre-FISA decision, United States v. Humphrey,'"' had held that
warrantless surveillance was unlawful once the gathering of foreign
intelligence was no longer the "primary purpose" of the surveillance, and
had identified the point at which the "primary purpose" had shifted to
criminal prosecution by conducting an evidentiary hearing to assess the
involvement of criminal prosecutors in the case.13 2 Although FISA as
enacted simply required certification as to "the" purpose of the surveillance,
defendants challenging FISA surveillance drew upon the Humphrey case to
128. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
129. Id. at 322-23.
130. Bellia, supra note 47, at 449-52.
131. 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978).
132. Id. at 58-59.
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argue that such surveillance could only proceed where the primary purpose
of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. Several
courts of appeals invoked the primary purpose test in dicta in upholding
FISA surveillance.13 3
In 1995, the Attorney General adopted guidelines concerning the sharing
of FISA-derived information between counterintelligence and criminal
investigators and prosecutors within the FBI and the Justice Department.134
These guidelines, which came to be known as the "wall" between
counterintelligence and criminal investigators, were prompted in part by
concern that a court following the Humphrey court's logic would use
contacts between such investigators to assess the purpose of FISA
surveillance. That is, the guidelines were designed to minimize the use of
FISA-derived information by criminal investigators, lest courts treat the
involvement of criminal prosecutors as evidence that the primary purpose of
the surveillance was to conduct a criminal investigation. After the Patriot
Act altered FISA to permit certification of "a significant purpose" rather
than "the purpose" to obtain foreign intelligence information, the FISC
itself appended a modified version of the 1995 guidelines to orders
approving surveillance requests. In other words, the FISC sought to
reintroduce the "wall" that the Justice Department believed it could
eliminate after passage of the USA Patriot Act.
When the Justice Department sought modification of the guidelines the
FISC imposed, the FISC rejected its request. The FISC did not decide the
case on constitutional grounds, and indeed claimed that the case raised no
constitutional issue' 3-even though the evolution of the 1995 guidelines
could be traced back to a Fourth Amendment decision. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCR") reversed the FISC's
statutory holding, but also concluded that the proposed Justice Department
guidelines did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'3 6 The FISCR observed
133. Bellia, supra note 47, at 454.
134. See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division; Director, FBI; Counsel for Intelligence Policy; and United States Attorneys,
Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign
Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (July 19, 1995), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html.
135. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 614 (FISA Ct. 2002) (en banc) ("The question before the Court involves
straightforward application of the FISA . .. and raises no constitutional questions that need to be
decided.").
136. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). More precisely, the
court concluded that the new guidelines are constitutional when construed to permit use of FISA
where the primary purpose of the surveillance or search is to obtain evidence of foreign
intelligence crimes (as distinct from ordinary crimes). See id.
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that the constitutional question "has no definitive jurisprudential answer."l 37
The reasonableness inquiry in any given case will turn on the differences
between national security surveillance and surveillance related to ordinary
crime.138 Those differences include the government interest involved, the
goals of the surveillance, the secrecy required, and the logistical challenges
(such as the interrelationship of sources, precision with respect to the target,
and the practical problems involved where activities are planned and
conducted abroad). 131
If one considers the posture of the case before the FISCR-one
involving a court considering a Fourth Amendment challenge to a crisis
response statute in the immediate aftermath of its enactment-the FISCR's
holding is unsurprising. A crisis response statute reflects Congress's
assessment of urgent investigative demands, and that assessment will be
difficult to second-guess in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. Again, the
point here is not that the FISCR's decision is correct or incorrect. The point,
rather, is that courts' hands-off approach might reflect judicial deference to
Congress's superior ability to weigh privacy and law enforcement interests,
or it might reflect under-protection of privacy interests in the face of urgent
investigative demands.
3. Summary
Two key points emerge from this discussion. The first concerns the role
of courts in regulating surveillance techniques. Observing that statutes
predominate in communications surveillance law understates the role of
courts. Judicial regulation in cases involving executive rule selection is both
present and unsurprising. In addition, some judicial silence as to the
constitutionality of surveillance can be explained by the reactive nature of
the statutes involved, where courts have in fact largely driven the statute's
terms or Congress has sought to provide safeguards above those a court has
found the Constitution to require. The second key point concerns how we
might explain courts' hands-off approach. The fact that courts have played a
limited role in response to proactive statutes as well may reflect a welcome
norm of judicial deference to legislative action. On the other hand,
examining the surveillance law landscape in light of the patterns outlined
above reveals certain risks of under-enforcement-in the case of
modernizing statutes, a failure to dislodge assumptions about the path of
137. Id. at 746.
138. See Bellia, supra note 47, at 457.
139. See id. at 450-51 (culling these factors from Keith and subsequent decisions rejecting
Fourth Amendment challenges to FISA).
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technology, and in the case of crisis response statutes, a failure to isolate or
properly weigh the importance of government interests.
II. FROM FIRST-ORDER TO SECOND-ORDER QUESTIONS IN
SURVEILLANCE LAW
As Part I illustrated, calls for greater judicial and congressional
involvement in regulation of communications surveillance law tend to
understate the complexity of the judicial landscape in this area. Examining
that landscape in light of the institutional patterns identified above reveals
that the judicial abdication perspective and the legislative supremacy
perspective understate the role of courts.
Although we can identify contexts in which courts have played a limited
role, the normative significance of this fact is unclear. That is, we still face
questions about how courts should behave and about the relative
competence of legislatures and courts to set limits on executive surveillance
tactics. The surveillance law patterns identified above can help guide this
inquiry into institutional competence in at least two ways. First, examining
the relative roles of courts and the legislature in regulating surveillance
tactics reveals the particular risks of under-enforcement that proactive
statutes present. Second, the patterns suggest the sequential and iterative
nature of surveillance law, with decisions proceeding from executive rule
selection, to a judicial or legislative decision, to another judicial or
legislative decision, with the possibility of both constitutional and statutory
questions. The institutional patterns thus reveal opportunities to explore
how the decisions of one institution shape and constrain the decisions of the
next. In short, discussions of institutional competence should not overlook
the ways in which institutional design can shape the quality of decisions the
various institutions will produce.
This Part fleshes out this claim. Section A begins by exploring
institutional competence arguments through the lens of the institutional
patterns identified in Part I. Section B seeks to disentangle the relationship
between what we might call "second-order" design questions from the first-
order preferences and constitutional constraints on which institutional
competence arguments rely. Finally, Section C identifies and explores the
categories of design choices likely to affect the quality of decision-making
in this context.
43:0293] 327
328 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
A. Comparative Institutional Competence
As noted previously, scholars' views on what role courts should play in
setting surveillance law rules implicitly or explicitly reflect arguments about
institutional competence. Those scholars who would shift more decision-
making to courts, for example, see Congress as having been captured by
law enforcement interests on these issues.140 Legislative supremacy
scholars, in contrast, focus on how Congress can respond quickly to rapid
technological changes, whereas courts' case-by-case decisions will
necessarily involve a narrow and possibly outdated record.141
Institutional choice methodologies are, of course, controversial in many
respects.142 Indeed, it is certainly possible to fault both judicial abdication
scholars and legislative supremacy scholars for being insufficiently
comparative in their analysis. Judicial abdication scholars focus on the
pressures that law enforcement interests are likely to exert in Congress
without asking whether courts have the tools to assess how technological
changes will affect privacy and law enforcement interests.14 3 Legislative
supremacy scholars, in contrast, tend to focus on the legislature's speed and
technical expertise without asking how the access and influence of law
enforcement interests are likely to affect legislative outputs. It is beyond the
scope of this Essay to fully engage that debate. Rather, taking it as a given
that arguments about institutional competence are relevant to how we
allocate decision-making authority in surveillance law, I seek to show that
those arguments should account for how design choices affect the quality of
judicial and legislative decisions.
A word about goal choice is in order at the outset. Because institutional
competence arguments typically seek not to arrive at a legal rule, but rather
to determine which institution is best positioned to do so, identifying the
overarching policy goal that the legal rule is to serve is important. I identify
this overarching goal as providing appropriate checks on executive
discretion in the use of communications surveillance tactics; in theory, a
comparative institutional analysis should identify which institution is best-
positioned to set those checks. Although I believe that legislative supremacy
and judicial abdication scholars would agree on this goal, the goal is often
stated instead in terms of "balancing" privacy interests against legitimate
law enforcement needs. Professor Susan Freiwald has pointed out that the
140. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 73, at 914 (likening law enforcement agencies to regulated
industry); Swire, supra note 90, at 1348-50 (describing public choice realities of how
surveillance legislation is enacted).
141. Kerr, supra note 10, at 864-82.
142. Cf Solove, supra note 73, at 760.
143. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 73, at 914.
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"balancing" metaphor is a pervasive but problematic one, in that it assumes
that more information will in fact serve law enforcement needs and permits
privacy invasions even when less restrictive means to accomplish law
enforcement goals exist.1 " The policy goal as formulated above sidesteps
the question whether privacy trade-offs actually serve law enforcement
needs in favor of asking how the law can and should restrain executive
choices in this area.
I now examine the competing institutional competence arguments in
light of the institutional patterns identified in Part I.
1. Executive Rule-Selection
Institutional competence arguments about communications surveillance
law tend to focus on the choice between legislative and judicial controls on
executive action, without considering the possibility of the executive
restraining its own conduct in some way. Focusing on cases involving
executive-rule selection thus seem to add little to arguments about judicial
competence, because those who believe that courts are in a better position
than legislatures to police executive conduct certainly also believe that
courts are better than the executive itself.
Executive rule-selection cases raise an interesting challenge for
legislative supremacy scholars, however. If the thrust of the legislative
supremacy position is that legislative regulation of surveillance tactics is
preferable to judicial regulation, then courts should arguably decline to
intervene in cases involving executive rule-selection, so as to leave the
legislature with space to regulate. For example, in arguing that functional
considerations should lead courts to be "cautious" in evaluating challenges
to the use of new search technologies, Professor Kerr does not confine his
claims to situations where Congress has already passed a (proactive or
reactive) statute regulating the practice. That is, the call for "deference" or
"caution" is in part a call to leave the legislature space to work.
In this context, however, the broad delegation to the executive of
investigative powers means that judicial caution in favor of preserving
legislative space essentially privileges the executive's interpretation of its
powers. Whether or not such an approach might be appropriate under a
distinct assessment of institutional competence weighing the merits of
executive self-regulation against judicial and legislative approaches, it is
enough here to note that merely comparing legislative and judicial
144. Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 9, at 19-20.
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competencies (as legislative supremacy scholars do) is not enough to justify
a rule of legislative supremacy.
2. Legislative Rule-Selection
Turning from situations involving executive rule-selection to situations
involving legislative rule-selection allows two broad observations about
institutional competence arguments. First, questions about institutional
competence cut across statutory and constitutional issues. Once the
legislature dictates surveillance law rules, courts may be called upon to
evaluate the executive's implementation of those rules in light of the Fourth
Amendment, but they will also be called upon to interpret the statute itself.
An account that favors a statutory privacy framework to a Fourth
Amendment framework bears the burden of establishing that, as a matter of
institutional competence, (1) interposing a statute makes the court's
constitutional task easier, and (2) courts are likely to be more successful at
statutory construction in this area than they will be at constitutional
construction. On the first point, it is true that interposing a statute may
minimize the risk of judicial over-enforcement of the Fourth Amendment.
As discussed in Part I, however, legislative and thus judicial under-
enforcement is a significant risk in the case of proactive statutes. As to the
second point, the difficulties that courts might have with technology-laden
issues do not disappear when Congress adopts a statute governing use of the
technique. And if Congress does not speak with clarity, the risks of judicial
over-enforcement and under-enforcement of the statute still remain. Indeed,
one could argue that the background operation of the Fourth Amendment
can in fact improve statutory construction.
Consider, for example, the case of United States v. Councilman.'4 5 In
that case, the United States sought to prosecute a service provider that had
captured communications of its customers before transmitting them into
users' mailboxes.146 A key question was whether the provider's conduct
amounted to an "interception" under the Wiretap Act. More specifically, the
provider claimed that because it acquired the communications while they
were briefly stored in its system before being transmitted to the user's
mailbox,'47 the provider had not "intercepted" them within the meaning of
145. United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass. 2003) (Councilman 1),
affd, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004) (Councilman II), pet'n for reh'g en banc granted, 385 F.3d
793 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Councilman III).
146. Councilman 1, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
147. Councilman II, 373 F.3d at 199-200.
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the Wiretap Act. The district court agreed, 148 and the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed on the same reasoning. 149
As noted earlier, a number of courts have held that a non-
contemporaneous acquisition of communications from storage is not an
interception.'" The Councilman courts, however, took the analysis one step
further and held that even a contemporaneous acquisition of
communications from a storage point along the transmission path is not an
interception. If this interpretation were correct, then government officials
could rely on the less stringent procedures of the SCA to compel production
of a communication at any one of a number of points along its transmission
path, rather than obtaining a Title III order.'5 This interpretation
undoubtedly has constitutional implications as well as statutory ones. Had
the courts considered the constitutional implications of their approach, it
seems unlikely that they would have reached the same result. The
constitutional avoidance issue was briefed before the en banc First
Circuit,152 which ultimately reversed the district court. '
In short, to sustain functional arguments that the legislature is in a better
position to regulate executive surveillance tactics, one must conclude that
courts are better equipped for statutory construction than constitutional
interpretation or, at a minimum, that the dangers of erroneous statutory
construction are less significant than the dangers of erroneous constitutional
interpretation. The interdependence of the constitutional and statutory
frameworks, however, makes both arguments questionable.
The second observation that arises from legislative rule-selection cases is
that legislative design choices can themselves limit courts' ability to resolve
statutory or constitutional questions. Consider first the absence of a
statutory suppression remedy for electronic communications under the
Wiretap Act and for all communications under the SCA. The lack of a
suppression remedy limits courts' ability to address questions of statutory
interpretation-perhaps perpetuating impressions of judicial inability to
148. Councilman I, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
149. Councilman H1, 373 F.3d at 204.
150. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Senator Patrick J. Leahy as Amicus Curiae
Supporting the United States and Urging Reversal at 10-11, United States v. Councilman, 418
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (No. 03-1383), available at http://www.cdt.org/
wiretap/20041112leahy.pdf; Supplemental Brief for Center for Democracy and Technology et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the United States in Favor of Reversal at 1-4, United States v.
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (No. 03-1383), available at
http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/20041112joint.pdf.
152. Supplemental Brief for Center for Democracy and Technology et al. at 1-4.
153. Councilman III, 418 F.3d at 67.
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resolve complex surveillance questions. Consider also Congress's choice to
incorporate electronic communications into the Wiretap Act. That choice
obviated the need for courts to consider whether users can reasonably
expect privacy in electronic communications, but it has also hampered
courts' ability to articulate a coherent theory of how the Fourth Amendment
applies to electronic communications in storage, where they are less well
protected by statute.
Apart from these general observations about the problems of institutional
competence arguments in cases where the legislature has chosen the rule
that constrains the executive, it is worth making two additional points with
respect to proactive statutes. First, I noted that Congress often confides
important statutory questions in courts, but in the particular context of
ECPA, Congress has limited courts' ability to interpret the relevant
provisions by withholding a statutory suppression remedy. Without such a
remedy, statutory challenges to executive action do not arise in criminal
proceedings. No doubt the omission of a suppression remedy was motivated
in part by a belief that no such remedy was warranted, 154 not a specific
desire to foreclose judicial interpretation. The absence of a tool for courts to
evaluate the SCA's terms in a criminal context, however, can hamper not
only judicial evaluation, but also legislative evaluation. To the extent that
judicial decision-making exposes an executive interpretation of the law, it
facilitates public and legislative oversight. The paucity of judicial decisions
under the SCA makes it unsurprising that Congress has made few
significant changes to the SCA. Executive interpretations of the statute are
largely shielded from view in the absence of other more direct oversight
mechanisms. Although Congress has updated ECPA on nearly a dozen
occasions over the last twenty-five years, most of the amendments other
than the Patriot Act reflect fairly technical changes to the existing statutory
framework.
3. Summary
None of this discussion is intended to suggest that broader judicial
intervention on constitutional grounds is appropriate."' Rather, it is to
suggest that arguments about institutional competence tend to oversimplify
the surveillance law landscape. Calls for greater judicial enforcement focus
154. See supra note 78 (noting that Justice Department demanded omission of suppression
remedy).
155. Cf Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991) (questioning premise that perceived defects in political
process justify broader judicial review).
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on executive rule-selection cases at the expense of legislative rule-selection
cases. Calls for legislative supremacy, on the other hand, overlook the fact
that a hands-off approach can privilege executive interpretations and
substitute complex statutory questions for constitutional ones. Such
arguments also ignore design issues, overlooking how one institution's
decisions constrain or eliminate the possibility of another's response and
how changes in institutional design could be used to improve the quality of
legislative and judicial decisions.
B. Second-Order Design Questions
In this section, I seek to bring institutional design issues into play by
trying to isolate those issues from normative preferences about and
constitutional constraints on communications surveillance law. I then seek
to identify types of design mechanisms most likely to affect the quality of
decisions.
1. First-Order Preferences versus Second-Order Design Choices
The goal of institutional competence analysis is to arrive at the best
institution to set first-order preferences about a particular goal-in this case
(under the goal choice previously described) the best institutions to
establish and police limits on executive discretion in use of surveillance
tactics. Comparative institutional analysis proceeds from a position of
neutrality as to what first-order preferences should be. To distinguish first-
order preferences from second-order design issues, however, it is useful to
get a flavor of the range of first-order preferences that the communications
surveillance law framework reflects.
The Wiretap Act, for example, reflects robust limitations on executive
discretion to acquire the contents of communications in transit: it restricts
the kind of information agents can seek (to information concerning a crime
that has been, is being, or will be committed), restricts how much
information agents can seek (that which can be gathered within a period of
up to 30 days, subject to renewal), and restricts the purpose for which
agents can gather information (preventing or investigating criminal
activity). These restrictions could obviously be implemented in a range of
ways, and I refer to these choices as second-order design choices.
Consider the limitation that information gathered under the Wiretap Act
must pertain to a crime. By statute, applications for surveillance of wire and
oral communications require the approval of a high-level Justice
Department official, and thus proceed through a centralized executive
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branch review process."' In theory, the effect of such a requirement is to
centralize decision-making and vest it in politically accountable officials,
and perhaps even to place certain executive officials in a quasi-judicial rule.
By most accounts, in practice this requirement has had the effect of making
the wiretap application process a fairly burdensome one for investigators."'
The Wiretap Act's high-level executive review requirements no doubt
contributed to the institutional evolution within the Justice Department,
with the Criminal Division's Office of Enforcement Operations serving as a
gatekeeper for the Title III order process. The statute, however, does not
rest on executive assessment alone; it requires a judicial finding of probable
cause, and at the federal level even confines that authority to district court
judges (rather than magistrates).' Other aspects of the statute reflect a
different allocation of responsibility. Law enforcement officials must
'minimize" interception of communications not authorized to be
intercepted, but judicial checks on whether they have done so are limited.'"
Indeed, the statute does not require judicial evaluation of whether evidence
of crimes other than those set forth in the application should be disclosed,
thus leaving the matter to executive discretion. 6 0 The statute does, however,
require judicial evaluation of whether other-crimes evidence should be
admitted into court.161
It should be obvious that second-order design mechanisms will often
move with first-order preferences, in the sense that a preference for greater
limits on executive discretion will lead to the selection of design
mechanisms that rely less on executive policy and more on other
institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, many different design
combinations are available to meet first-order preferences. A goal of
preventing unlawful executive surveillance, for example, might be achieved
equally well through a statutory suppression mechanism and through the
availability of a civil damages remedy against executive officials who
authorize the surveillance.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006).
157. For this reason, many government officials argue that the fact that Wiretap Act
applications are rarely rejected is not indicative of too-lenient judicial scrutiny. I discuss a
related dynamic with respect to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review's role in the FISA
process in Bellia, supra note 47, at 470.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3); § 2510(9)(a).
159. Id. § 2518(5).
160. Id. § 2517(5).
161. Id.
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2. Constitutional Constraints
It is important to explore how constitutional restrictions constrain (and
do not constrain) both first-order preferences and second-order design
elements. Under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy constitutes
a "search" and generally must be preceded by a warrant.'6 2 Current Fourth
Amendment doctrine thus acts as a backstop to normative arguments about
executive discretion in surveillance law, for it prevents the executive from
assigning to itself the task of determining how much evidence of criminal
activity justifies conducting a "search," and whether that standard is met in
a given situation. Beyond that, however, the Constitution imposes minimal
constraints on first-order preferences. Nothing requires or prevents limits on
executive surveillance tactics when the Fourth Amendment does not
demand them.
Similarly, regarding second-order questions, the Fourth Amendment sets
a floor but not a ceiling. A determination that a particular technique invades
an expectation of privacy and thus constitutes a search will dictate some
design rules, for it will require a mechanism for a judicial magistrate to
determine before the search occurs that the search is supported by probable
cause and is reasonable in scope. Where the Fourth Amendment does not
compel such a determination, a legislature is free to impose procedures and
allocate authority among the branches as it sees fit, and it is likewise free to
impose requirements beyond those dictated by the Fourth Amendment.
If multiple options are available to meet first order preferences, and those
options are sometimes independent of constitutional questions, then the
possibilities for improving decisional outcomes about surveillance law
tactics become more readily apparent.
C. The Impact of Design Choices
The previous section attempted to isolate design choices from other
features of the communications surveillance law regime, including
normative preferences about how much to limit executive discretion and
constitutional constraints operating in the background. Here, I explore those
design mechanisms most likely to affect the quality of legislative and
judicial decisions about the rules governing use of surveillance techniques.
It is useful to discuss these design mechanisms with reference to an
increasingly common communications surveillance tactic, involving the
gathering of cell-site location information-that is, data concerning the
162. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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location of particular cell phone towers "hit" by a target's phone. Data from
multiple towers can be triangulated (with various degrees of precision) to
identify a suspect's physical location. The first CSLI requests to become
publicly known involved applications for court orders compelling cell
phone providers to collect and produce data concerning multiple towers
within range of the suspect's phone, even when no call was in progress."'
In a series of applications, the government argued that it was entitled to
acquire such data by meeting the requirements of two different statutes: the
pen register and trap-and-trace device statute'64 and a portion of the Stored
Communications Act governing disclosure of customer records.165 That
approach was based on the theory that information concerning a cell
phone's contact with cell towers literally fell within pen/trap statute, which
covers devices used to obtain "signaling" information; although CALEA
barred officials from relying solely on the pen/trap statute to obtain location
information, a "hybrid" order under the pen/trap provisions and provisions
of the SCA regulating access to customer records would suffice to compel
production of that information.
Numerous magistrate judges accepted the government's argument and
granted the requested "hybrid" order. In 2005, however, two magistrate
judges faced with such requests rejected the government's "hybrid"
approach, concluding that officials could only gather such data after
obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.16 6 A third judge followed
suit,167 prompting the government to seek more limited information in
subsequent cases. 6
163. See In re Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14,
2005) (Smith, Mag. J.).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3121.
165. Id. § 2703(d).
166. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
24, 2005) (Orenstein, Mag. J.) (rejecting government's legal theory but noting that scope of
information sought may have been more limited than that sought in prior cases); In re
Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
167. In re Application of the United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. Nov. 29,
2005) (Bredar, Mag. J.)
168. More specifically, the United States advanced the "hybrid" theory to justify acquiring
information on single cell towers hit at the beginning, end, and (if reasonably available) during a
call. Such information, the government claimed, would yield only the subject's general location.
A majority of courts have rejected this "hybrid" approach when the government seeks to
gather information prospectively. In re Application of the United States, 2009 WL 159187, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009) (McMahon, J.); In re Application of the United States, 497 F. Supp.
2d 301, 311 (D.P.R. July 18, 2007) (McGiverin, Mag. J.); In re Application of the United States,
2006 WL 2871743, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006) (Adelman, J.); In re Application of the
United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 827-36 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2006) (Smith, Mag. J.); In re
Application of the United States, 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006) (Lee, J.); In re
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The insights of comparative institutional analysis theorists may help to
illustrate how the courts reached this result. Professor Neil Komesar's
"participation-centered" framework, for example, facilitates comparisons of
institutional performance by exploring, across institutions, differences
among those seeking legal change in terms of the costs and benefits of
institutional participation.' 69 More specifically, in Komesar's model, the
character of institutional participation varies according to the distribution of
stakes in the outcome, and variations in the cost of participation-including
the costs of obtaining relevant information regarding the issue in question,
organizing those with an interest in the outcome, and barriers to access
associated with institutional rules and procedures. 7 0
The first two judges to reject the "hybrid" theory for CSLI considered
the government's applications in ordinary ex parte proceedings, but then
sought amicus participation in opposition to the government's position. The
judges essentially shifted participation costs. We can view the potential
"stakeholders" in the decision as law enforcement officials on the one hand,
and potential surveillance targets on the other. Potential targets are likely to
have minimal knowledge about how the government interprets and applies
surveillance law statutes, and an ex parte process obviously provides formal
institutional barriers to the participation of any potential target. An ex parte
proceeding may be unobjectionable when it involves application of a settled
legal rule to a particular set of facts, rather than evaluation of executive
Application of the United States, 439 F. Supp. 2d 456, 458 (D. Md. June 24, 2006) (Bredar,
Mag. J.); In re Application of the United States, 2006 WL 468300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2006) (Peck, Mag. J.); In re Application of the United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (D. Md.
Feb. 27, 2006) (Bredar, Mag. J.); In re Application of the United States, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211,
219 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2006) (Feldman, Mag. J.); In re Application of the United States, 407 F.
Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2006) (Facciola, J.); In re Application of the United States,
412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 958 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 1, 2006) (Callahan, Mag. J.); In re Application of the
United States, 2005 WL 3658531, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005) (Robinson, Mag. J.); see also In
re Application of the United States, 2006 WL 6217584 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2006) (Hogan, J.)
(issuing a warrant under Rule 41 for disclosure of prospective cell site location information).
A minority of courts have approved applications under this theory. In re Application of the
United States, 2009 WL 1594003 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2009) (Garaufis, J.); In re Application of
the United States, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2008) (Garaufis, J.); In re
Application of the United States, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007)
(Rosenthal, J.); In re Application for an Order, 2007 WL 397129 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2007); In re
Application of the United States, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006) (Kaplan,
J.); In re Application of the United States, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2006)
(Rosenthal, J.); In re Application of the United States, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (W.D. La. Jan.
26, 2006) (Hornsby, Mag. J.); In re Application of the United States, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2005) (Gorenstein, Mag. J.).
169. NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1994).
170. Id.
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rule-selection in the first instance. By soliciting amicus participation in an
executive rule-selection case, the judges effectively adjusted participation
costs in an area of great legal uncertainty.
It bears reminder that the purpose of the participation-centered model I
discuss here is comparative: the point is not that shifting participation costs
makes it more likely that courts will reach the right substantive result.
Rather, the shift is important to the extent that, in adjusting the stakes and
costs within one or more institutions, it changes the benchmark against
which to measure the performance of other institutions (in this case, the
legislature).
In the next Part, I further develop this approach to design choice.
III. IMPROVING DESIGN CHOICES IN COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE
LAW
In Part II, I suggested that institutional competence claims about whether
courts or legislatures are best suited to limit executive discretion in
surveillance tactics envision a binary institutional choice rather than an
iterative process, and take institutional design as a given. I then explored,
with the help of the cell-site dispute, how design choices might matter in
this context. In particular, I focused on choices that alter the costs and
benefits of institutional participation, whether in courts or legislatures.
In this Part, I elaborate upon those observations. My analysis proceeds
from the premise that a prevailing surveillance law regime might differ
from that which would match first-order policy preferences (whether courts,
legislatures, or both arrive at those preferences). I first identify features that
alter the cost and benefit of institutional participation in surveillance law
decisions; I then apply some of these features in the context of two of the
institutional patterns identified in Part I of this Essay.
As will become clear, the features I discuss all serve in various ways to
check executive discretion in the use of surveillance law tactics, and are
thus vulnerable to the charge that they simply mask a normative preference
for greater privacy. The executive-checking function, however, simply
flows from my assumption-which I believe to be uncontroversial-that the
role of a surveillance law regime is to cabin executive discretion. Moreover,
it is important to note that I do not urge application of all of these measures
across any particular range of surveillance law questions. Rather, my claim
is that courts and legislatures should consider adopting certain measures for
certain high-stakes decisions, particularly those involving courts' review of
newly selected surveillance rules and those involving legislatures' adoption
of proactive statutes.
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A. Theory: Shifting Stakes and Costs
In this Section, I consider some of the design tools available to shift the
stakes and costs of participants in legislative and judicial decisions about
surveillance tactics.
Stakes. As to both judicial and legislative decisions constraining
communications surveillance tactics, law enforcement interests have high
stakes. Congressional action within the legislative process will generate
nationwide rules authorizing or constraining law enforcement techniques.
The stakes might seem lower with respect to any individual judicial
decision about the legality of a surveillance technique, except that decisions
regarding large-scale providers (such as America Online or Yahoo!) can
effectively nationalize surveillance rules as well."' In short, whether in
legislative or judicial fora, law enforcement interests have strong incentives
to press for expansive interpretations of surveillance law powers.
Although law enforcement stakes are high in either context, two
mechanisms, one legislative and one judicial, can operate to shift those
stakes. First, a "sunset" mechanism of the sort adopted in the USA Patriot
Act further raises the stakes of law enforcement participation in the
legislative process, because law enforcement interests face the potential loss
of existing surveillance powers rather than merely an absence of new
powers. Second, statutes that restrain both law enforcement conduct and
private conduct may temper law enforcement stakes in achieving a narrow
construction of the statutory provisions, because in eliminating restrictions
on their own conduct, law enforcement officials also eliminate their ability
to prosecute private parties for similar conduct.17 2
171. The nationalizing effect of decisions regarding Internet service providers should not,
however, be overstated. Before Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, the SCA required
investigators seeking to compel a provider to disclose communications to obtain the relevant
order in the district in which the provider was located. Thus, for example, requests for America
Online to disclose communications would be made to the Eastern District of Virginia, no matter
where the investigation was proceeding. In the Patriot Act, Congress authorized courts of the
jurisdiction in which the investigation was proceeding to grant such orders. See CCIPS
MANUAL, supra note 117, at 134 (noting that the SCA permits a judge to compel production of
records located in another district); Bellia, supra note 23, at 1454 (describing change). The
change raises the possibility that requests directed to the same provider will be subject to
different standards, depending on the law of the investigating jurisdiction.
172. Professor Paul Ohm calls such statutes "parallel-effect" statutes. See Paul K. Ohm,
Parallel-Effect Statutes and E-Mail "Warrants": Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1599 (2004); Bellia, supra note 127, at 1341 (discussing government's
complex incentives in this context). For a related argument about statutes containing both civil
and criminal penalties, see Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 2209 (2003).
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In both the legislative process and the judicial process, the benefits to
potential targets of limitations on executive discretion in surveillance law
are likely to be widely dispersed. Any actual target is completely outside of
the legislative process, but may have high stakes in the judicial process.
These stakes, however, are largely a function of design. Under the Wiretap
Act, for example, a surveillance target is entitled to suppression of evidence
for purely statutory violations in cases involving acquisition of wire and
oral communications, but not in cases involving acquisition of electronic
communications.173 No statutory suppression remedy is available under the
SCA.174
Finally, communications providers add another layer of complexity to
the analysis. In the legislative process and in the judicial process, providers
are likely to have an incentive to advocate limits on executive discretion in
surveillance law because broader use of surveillance techniques will be
costly to providers. Of course, cost-shifting statutes, such as the provisions
of CALEA requiring the government to reimburse carriers for some costs of
updating equipment to facilitate surveillance requests,'7 ' as well as other
assistance provisions in surveillance law statutes themselves, 7 6 may limit
providers' incentives to seek restraints on executive discretion in
surveillance law. Indeed, although government officials have reportedly
used hundreds-of-thousands of national security letters to seek information
from various record holders,177 and presumably a sizable number of these
letters were issued to communications providers under the SCA's NSL
provisions, there have been only a handful of publicly reported instances of
providers challenging NSLs."' On the other hand, a provider's incentives
may be complicated by the anticipated backlash if it cooperates, or the
anticipated praise if it refuses to cooperate, with a request that its
subscribers or the public perceive to be unreasonable. 17
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10) (2006).
174. Id. § 2708 (providing that civil remedies are exclusive nonconstitutional remedies for
violations of SCA).
175. See 47 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006).
176. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (requiring governmental entity to reimburse provider for
reasonably necessary costs directly incurred in "searching for, assembling, reproducing, or
otherwise providing" requested communications or records).
177. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF
THE FBI'S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, at 9 (2008).
178. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334
F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
179. For example, Twitter successfully challenged, to much public approbation, the secrecy
attached to a court order demanding that it provide information regarding the accounts of
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Information costs. Both in the legislative process and in the judicial
process, law enforcement interests will have full access to all information
about executive interpretations of surveillance law rules, the frequency with
which certain tactics are deployed, and how effective those statutes are. In
both the legislative process and the judicial process, information costs of
actual and potential targets-as well as communications providers-are
much higher.
Consider first the possible sources of information about executive
interpretations of surveillance law rules. Such interpretations can emerge in
the context of individual cases, but of course, whether they do so depends in
part on the likelihood that a target will challenge use of the surveillance
tactic-which in turn depends on the target's stake in the outcome of the
case. As we have seen, the absence of a statutory suppression mechanism,
as for electronic communications under the Wiretap Act and the SCA, will
tend to limit courts' opportunity to construe the relevant statutes. The FISA
regime yields a similar observation. Although FISA contains a suppression
mechanism, a surveillance target typically only receives notice of the
surveillance when the government intends to introduce FISA-derived
information in a judicial or other proceeding.' Although there have been
more than 28,000 FISA applications and renewals granted since 1979,
challenges to introduction of FISA-derived evidence or demands for
disclosure of FISA-derived evidence have been raised in approximately
thirty-five cases,18 1 and none of these challenges has been successful. 18 2
Questions about the legality of FISA surveillance also have arisen in a
handful of other cases not directly involving suppression or disclosure
motions, with only one court concluding that FISA surveillance was
unlawful. " Because questions concerning the legality of particular searches
particular subscribers. See Noam Cohen, Twitter Shines a Spotlight on Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at B3.
180. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)-(d) (2006). FISA also generally requires notice when the
Attorney General approves electronic surveillance on an emergency basis and a request for a
court order is subsequently denied. See id. § 1806(j).
181. The number in the text reflects cases published in the national reporter system or
available on Westlaw or Lexis. It includes eighteen cases in which a court of appeals affirmed
denial of a suppression motion and/or a motion seeking disclosure of FISA-derived evidence
and seventeen cases decided at the district court level and apparently not appealed. The figure
does not include purely procedural dispositions, such as a determination that a party lacks
standing to contest the legality of FISA's use or that a challenge to FISA's use is not properly
brought at a particular stage of the case.
182. Although suppression is also quite rare in the Title III context, the sheer number of
suppression motions under Title III makes tabulation and comparison impossible.
183. Such cases might involve, for example, a civil suit, a request by the government for a
declaratory judgment concerning the legality of the surveillance, or a challenge referred to a
U.S. district court concerning evidence sought to be used in a foreign proceeding. A district
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arise relatively infrequently, judicial articulation of legal norms under FISA
is quite rare. We can glean some information about executive interpretation
of FISA from episodic reporting on particular crises.18 in general, however,
the information costs for those seeking to impose limits on executive
discretion, whether in courts or in the legislature, are high.
Consider next the possible sources of information about how widely the
executive uses certain surveillance law tactics. When no statute compels the
release of such information, outsiders must rely on information the
government voluntarily releases or the fruits of Freedom of Information Act
litigation.
Certain design mechanisms can of course shift these information costs. I
have elsewhere discussed the "information structure" of the foreign
intelligence surveillance scheme-that is, the institutional mechanisms
designed to generate the information necessary for evaluation of how the
executive and the FISC have implemented the foreign intelligence
surveillance framework.' Post-surveillance review is sufficiently rare that
it does not provide much informational value, but Congress has also
imposed certain public and inter-branch reporting requirements on the
executive.186 More specifically, FISA requires the Attorney General to
transmit to the Administrative Office of United States Courts and to
Congress reports setting forth "the total number of applications made for
orders and extensions of orders approving electronic surveillance" under
FISA and "the total number of such orders and extensions either granted,
modified, or denied."' The statute also requires the Attorney General to
"fully inform" the congressional intelligence committees "concerning all
electronic surveillance" under FISA.18 1 In addition, as enacted FISA
required the intelligence committees, for five years after FISA's enactment,
to report to their respective chambers concerning implementation of the
statute, including whether FISA should be amended, repealed, or permitted
court declared FISA surveillance unlawful in Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023
(D. Or. 2007), but the ruling was vacated on procedural grounds. Mayfield v. United States, 599
F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
184. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: COORDINATION
WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS Is LIMITED 11-15 (2001)
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-780; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REVIEW TEAM
ON THE HANDLING OF THE Los ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY INVESTIGATION, FINAL REPORT
707-52 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows.htm.
185. See generally Bellia, supra note 47.
186. See S. REP. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 60 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,
3961-62; S. REP. No. 95-701, at 66-67 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4035-36.
187. 50 U.S.C. § 1807 (2006).
188. Id § 1808(a).
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to continue in effect.189 All of these reports were made public.o90 At least in
theory, these sorts of requirements lower information costs by allowing both
for the evaluation of FISA's privacy implications and for the evaluation of
the executive's and the FISC's fidelity to congressional intent. (As
discussed below, although FISA as enacted reflected a carefully designed
information structure, Congress has paid far less attention to such measures
as the statute has evolved.)
Institutional barriers and other organizational costs. Finally, I briefly
examine institutional barriers and other organizational costs reflected in the
surveillance law regime. Law enforcement interests face minimal
institutional barriers in courts or the legislature. When seeking an ex parte
application to use a particular surveillance tactic, law enforcement will be
the sole party represented, and the government will always be available to
defend a suppression motion. There will of course be some cases where
interpretations of surveillance law statutes will arise in purely civil disputes
to which the government is not a party. In such cases, courts' interpretations
of the statutes will bear upon the scope of agents' authority. Because courts
appear to readily accept amicus participation by the United States in such
cases, however, institutional barriers remain low.
For actual and potential surveillance targets, the institutional barriers and
other organization costs are much more significant. In the legislative
process, dispersed stakes come with higher organization costs, although the
growth in information privacy groups (and the ease with which they can
reach members via the Internet) may reduce such costs. Potential targets
will not be represented in ex parte proceedings involving applications for
use of surveillance tactics unless, as in the cell site cases, courts invite amici
to participate.
Finally, communications providers are sufficiently organized that they
will face relatively low costs in the legislative process. When providers are
not forced to bear the cost of surveillance tactics, however, they have
limited incentives to oppose government demands for more surveillance
power. In the judicial process, a provider that receives a surveillance order
will have standing to seek to quash the application, and so there are no
formal institutional barriers to its participation. Yet unless a request is
particularly burdensome, or the provider fears a backlash if its compliance
189. Id. § 1808(b).
190. See S. REP. No. 98-660 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 98-738 (1984); S. REP. No. 97-691
(1982); H.R. REP. No. 97-974 (1982); S. REP. No. 97-280 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 97-318 (1981);
S. REP. No. 96-117 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 96-1466 (1980); S. REP. No. 96-379 (1979); H.R.
REP. No. 96-558 (1979).
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with government investigators becomes public, its incentives to challenge
government surveillance tactics may be limited.
B. Application: Executive Rule-Selection and Proactive Statutes
The previous section explored the stakes and costs of various parties
interested in how courts and legislatures should check executive discretion
as to the use of surveillance law techniques. I identified a number of ways
in which design changes could shift the stakes or costs involved.
In this section, I attempt to make the analysis more concrete by returning
to some of the institutional patterns identified in Part I. (I leave aside
"reactive" legislative rules.) Although I have identified a number of design
changes that could shift the stakes and costs of participants in the legislative
and judicial processes, I have not suggested that any or all of these shifts
would be appropriate in particular cases. Here, I attempt to isolate some
patterns in which the costs of legislative or judicial error are particularly
high, and where shifting the levels of institutional participation may
therefore be helpful.
1. Judicial Decisions on Executive Rule-Selection
The institutional patterns of Part I illustrated that scholars often
understate the judicial role in the surveillance law landscape. Because
Congress reacts to judicial decisions, whether to implement the decision or
to supplement weak procedural rules the court prescribes, the judicial
decision fades into to the background. As I argued in Part I, however, even
where a statute immediately follows a judicial decision, the initial decision
likely determines whether there will be strong or weak checks on the
executive's use of a particular surveillance tactic."'
It follows that judicial responses to instances of executive rule-selection
represent the most important point of judicial decision, for they likely set
the path of future legislative action. This fact counsels in favor of courts
seeking the fullest possible participation when a new question about
executive rule-selection arises. The magistrate judges who invited amicus
participation at the ex parte application stage had precisely this instinct.
Amicus participation not only reduces the information costs and lowers
participation barriers for potential targets (represented by privacy groups), it
also raises the government's participation costs, and may thereby cause law
enforcement officials to gauge more precisely the need for the tactic
191. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
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involved. In late 2006, for example, the government filed an application in
the Southern District of New York seeking disclosure of the contents of text
messages logged with a service provider. When the court notified the
government that it intended to invite amicus participation and request
briefing, the government immediately withdrew the application.19 2
2. Proactive Statutes
Recall the two categories of "proactive" statutes in Part I: "modernizing"
statutes, in which Congress makes a judgment about the state of technology
and metes out roles for executive and judicial participation in the process of
deciding when the substantive standards are met; and "crisis response"
statutes, in which Congress responds to perceived intelligence or
investigative failures by filling gaps. Each pattern presents a serious risk
that a mismatch will develop between the statute and first-order policy
preferences. In the case of a modernizing statute, we can assume that first-
order preferences remain relatively constant, but changes in technology alter
the effective scope of the surveillance tactics the statute allows. In the case
of a crisis response statute, we can posit that the statute matches preferences
when passed, but that a mismatch occurs when preferences return to pre-
crisis levels. How might design choices help Congress or the courts correct
a mismatch?
a. Crisis Response Statutes
The design possibilities on the legislative side are best illustrated by the
model of the crisis-response statute. I earlier described the gradual
expansion of FISA's scope as a series of responses to perceived
investigative failures.' FISA initially covered electronic surveillance.
Congress later added provisions authorizing FISC orders for physical
searches, the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, and production
of business records.'94 In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Congress
loosened the necessary showing of purpose' 95 and dramatically expanded
the category of items that could be compelled from third parties to
encompass tangible things rather than business records.' 9
192. E-mail from Kevin Bankston, Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation to
author (Feb. 13, 2007) (on file with author).
193. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
195. See Bellia, supra note 47, at 452-56; supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
196. See Bellia, supra note 47, at 447.
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For purposes of the discussion, we can assume that short-term changes in
first-order policy preferences facilitated at least some of these statutory
changes. The question is whether Congress (or the courts) will adjust the
provisions if preferences shift back to pre-crisis levels. The stakeholders in
the ultimate decision are law enforcement officials, actual (known and
unknown) and potential surveillance targets, and communications providers
who must execute surveillance orders. Law enforcement officials will have
the lowest information-gathering and organization costs; they have access to
all relevant information on the use of surveillance tactics as well as
routinized contacts with the congressional committees most likely to
influence the decisional outcomes here. Although communications
providers are sufficiently well organized that they may not face high
organization costs, they are unlikely to have substantial information on the
scope and effectiveness of surveillance tactics, outside of cases in which
they have been specifically involved. Since actual targets are not known in
advance, the information and organization costs are insurmountable. The
matter is left to potential targets-i.e., the public. Even assuming that the
increasing concentration of information privacy groups will make
organization costs more manageable, the information costs remain high.
Note, however, how design mechanisms can shift the dynamics. A sunset
mechanism such as that included in the USA Patriot Act substantially shifts
the parties' stakes by making a resort to the status quo ante a consequence
of inaction.
Merely adding a sunset mechanism, however, does not necessarily alter
the information costs the parties face. Here, a robust "information structure"
along the lines I described above becomes critical.' As I have argued
elsewhere, however, although FISA's original information structure was a
careful counterweight to the absence of broad post-surveillance review on
the structure, until recently Congress has entirely neglected that information
structure, despite the dramatic expansions in statutory scope.198 Even recent
changes that on the surface are designed to expand the executive's reporting
requirements have been narrowly interpreted to permit classified reporting.
b. Modernizing Statutes
The design possibilities on the judicial side are best illustrated by the
example of modernizing statutes. Depending on the statutory scheme,
judicial intervention could take one of three forms: (1) ex parte review of an
application for surveillance; (2) review of a communication provider's
197. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
198. Bellia, supra note 47, at 462-67.
3 46 [ Ariz. S t. L.J.
DESIGNING SURVEILLANCE LAW
objection to an order (presumably in the context of a motion to quash); (3)
or some form of ex post review.
I have already discussed the importance of amicus participation at the ex
parte application stage when a court assesses executive rule-selection.1 99
The arguments there fully support amicus participation in evaluation of an
application under a modernizing statute as well. When technology shifts to
the point where mapping a statute onto new technology becomes difficult,
the executive's interpretation of the statute functionally becomes more like
an a legal interpretation outside of the confines of a statute. Interpreting the
statute narrowly, moreover, tends to privilege the executive's interpretation
of the law, just as a cautious approach to the Fourth Amendment does in the
case of executive rule selection.
Finally, the absence of ex post enforcement mechanisms will defeat
courts' ability to resolve a case in the situation when the most stakeholders
are likely to be represented and when the stakes are highest. Indeed, we can
identify several current surveillance statutes as to which the law is
underdeveloped, in all likelihood because of the absence of an ex post
enforcement mechanism.2 00 As noted earlier, the absence of a suppression
mechanism not only affects courts' ability to check executive discretion in
use of surveillance techniques, it can eventually affect legislatures' ability
to do so as well, by eliminating public scrutiny of executive interpretations
of the law.2 0'
IV. CONCLUSION
Explaining the limited nature of judicial regulation of surveillance tactics
in the post-Katz era is perhaps easier than it seems: judicial silence in
communications surveillance cases is a function of context, and sometimes
masks a powerful behind-the-scenes judicial rule, but other times reflects
the difficulty of dislodging executive powers in the wake of technological
shifts or changing views of a recent crisis. The harder puzzle for
surveillance law scholars is how to sort out the appropriate legislative and
judicial roles. Second-order design techniques play a thus-far
199. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
200. Neither the pen register and trap-and-trace device statute nor the Stored
Communications Act contains a statutory suppression remedy. For related arguments about how
suppression remedies would improve interpretation of the SCA, see Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the
"Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime
Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 807 (2003); Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 9, at 63.
201. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
43:0293] 347
348 ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
underappreciated role in influencing the quality of decisional outcomes in
such controversies.
